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DISSENT, FREE SPEECH, AND THE 
CONTINUING SEARCH FOR THE "CENTRAL 
MEANING'' OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.* 
THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, 
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY. By Stephen L. Carter. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 167. Cloth, $20.50; paper, 
$12.95. 
DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA. By Steven 
H. Shiffrin. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 204. 
$29.95. 
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves ex­
terminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only 
the unanimity of the graveyard.1 
Since the Warren Court's expansive construction of the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, there has been no shortage of 
legal scholarship aimed at justifying the remarkably broad protections 
afforded the freedom of speech under landmark cases such as 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 and Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 4 
At the same time, in recent years, a growing chorus of free speech 
skeptics have made their voices heard.5 These legal scholars have 
* Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A.1987, M.A. 
{Philosophy) 1987, Emory; J.D. 1991, LL.M. 1991, Duke. - Ed. I would like to thank Pro­
fessors Frank Bowman, Dan Cole, Jeff Cooper, Kenny Crews, Michael Heise, Lyrissa 
Barnett Lidsky, Betsy Wilborn Malloy, Gerry Moohr, David Orentlicher, Gary Spitko, Jim 
Torke, and Brad Wendel for offering very helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
Review. As always, any errors or omissions are mine alone. 
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
2. 395 U.S. 444 {1969). 
3. 376 U.S. 254 {1964). 
4. 425 U.S. 748 {1976). 
5. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: 
HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT {1997); STANLEY FISH, 
THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too {1994); 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS {1993); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS 
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT {1993); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial In­
sults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 {1982); Charles R. 
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questioned why a commitment to freedom of expression should dis­
place other (constitutional) values such as equality, community, or 
citizenship. 
This spirited challenge to the Warren Court's free speech ortho­
doxy has given rise to a kind of free speech counter-Reformation. De­
fenders of the free speech tradition have joined the fray, challenging 
those who question the value of racist, sexist, or homophobic expres­
sion. 6 
The debate has taken place against the backdrop of a longstanding 
controversy about the "central meaning"7 of the First Amendment's 
Free Speech Clause. Since Justices Holmes and Brandeis began force­
fully applying the Free Speech Clause to provide broad protection to 
political speech activity,8 scholars have been deeply divided over the 
precise rationale for according speech protection when the speech im­
poses significant social costs on the general community. Classic theo­
ries of free speech, such as Alexander Meiklejohn's "democratic de­
liberation" thesis,9 have competed with newer rationales for protecting 
free expression, such as the pursuit of truth, self-realization, or per-
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). 
6. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Lib­
erty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censor­
ship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 193 (1996); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1009 (1996) [hereinaf­
ter Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review]; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992). 
7. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment," l964 SUP. er. REv.191. 
8. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) {Holmes, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court formally 
embraced the Holmes/Brandeis vision of the First Amendment in Brandenburg and has not 
looked back since. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-49 {1969). But see Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 {1986) {holding that Title VII permits a cause of action 
based on a "hostile work environment," an environment that might be created and main­
tained through speech activity); Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 
1999) {upholding an injunction against manager's use of racist language, free speech objec­
tions notwithstanding); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 
RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995). 
9. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF­
GOVERNMENT {1948) (arguing that speech should be protected only insofar as it facilitates 
democratic deliberation within the community) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH]; 
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment ls an Absolute, 1961 SUP. er. REV. 245 
[hereinafter Meiklejohn, The First Amendment]. Harry Kalven continued the Meiklejohn 
project, see Kalven, supra note 7, and Owen Fiss carries the torch today, articulating force­
fully the democratic-deliberation theory of the Free Speech Clause, see OWEN M. Flss, THE 
IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); OWEN M. Flss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND TIIE MANY USES OF STATE POWER {1996) [hereinafter Flss, LIBERALISM 
DIVIDED]; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 {1987). 
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sonal autonomy.Io Other scholars have suggested more practical ra­
tionales for protecting free expression, such as avoiding social disorder 
by permitting disgruntled elements of the community to vent their 
frustrations peacefully .11 
Two recent books, one by Professor Steven ShiffrinI2 and the other 
by Professor Stephen Carter,13 propose a renewed focus on protecting 
dissent as the central value of the First Amendment. Both works posit 
that the government's response to dissent should serve as the key to 
evaluating the overall effectiveness of the Supreme Court's free 
speech jurisprudence. Professor Shiffrin states his thesis as follows: 
"[T]he First Amendment spotlights a different metaphor than the 
marketplace of ideas or the richness of public debate; instead, it sup­
ports the American ideal of protecting and supporting dissent by put­
ting dissenters at the center of the First Amendment tradition" (p. 
128). Professor Carter sounds a similar theme arguing that "[c]ivic life 
requires dissent because it requires differences of opinion in order to 
spark the dialogues from which the community thrives and grows" (p. 
16). Carter goes even further, positing that the legitimacy of a gov­
ernment's demand of loyalty from its citizens should be a function of 
its treatment of those who dissent from its laws and policies: "[T]he 
justice of a state is not measured merely by its authority's tolerance for 
dissent, but also by its dissenters' tolerance for authority."I4 
A dissent-based theory of free speech has a great deal of superfi­
cial appeal. After all, who could be against dissent in a society osten­
sibly dedicated to permitting freedom of speech? Moreover, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has taken great pains to empha­
size that facilitating political dissent is a core project of the Free 
Speech Clause.Is These observations notwithstanding, there are rea-
10. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11-
14 (1984); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A 
TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.03, at 2-24, 2-25 (1994); Robert 
Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 
1525 (1997) (reviewing Flss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9). 
11. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 
(1970); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and the First Amendment Methodol· 
ogy, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 949 (1978). 
12. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. 
13. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale Law Scho'ol. 
14. P. 97; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend­
ment, 72 YALE LJ. 877, 882-84 (1963) (arguing that the First Amendment should facilitate 
broad-based participation in government decisionmaking and noting that "[o]nce one ac­
cepts the premise of the Declaration of Independence - that governments derive 'their just 
powers from the consent of the governed' - it follows that the governed must, in order to 
exercise their right of consent, have full freedom of expression both in forming individual 
judgments and in fomting the common judgment"). 
15. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-20 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 758-60 (1985) (plurality opinion); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 680 (1972); 
1616 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1613 
sons for skepticism about the federal courts' ability to devise and en­
force a viable dissent-based theory of free speech. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, there are serious definitional 
difficulties associated with determining whether or not speech consti­
tutes "dissent." Speech that is hostile to the actions of one branch of 
the government might be supportive of the actions of another.16 To a 
large degree, "dissent" is in the eyes of the beholder.17 As Professor 
Richard Delgado has observed, "[a]lthough Shiffrin, to his great 
credit, invented the dissent theory, neither he nor someone else com­
parably progressive will be able to dictate the manner in which courts 
will apply it. �'18 If citizens engaged in dissent have cause to fear being 
marginalized by prosecutors and judges drawn from the majority cul­
ture, they would have even more cause to fear being silenced under a 
regime that makes full First Amendment protection wholly contingent 
on the goodwill of a state functionary possessing the discretion to ap­
ply or withhold a talismanic label. 
In addition, the social costs of speech activity do not necessarily 
track whether speech constitutes "dissent." Indeed, some of the most 
potentially disruptive speech activity imaginable at least arguably con­
stitutes dissent - activities such as shooting physicians who provide 
abortion services or bombing federal facilities.19 Less extreme exam­
ples of dissenting expressive conduct include flag burning or the 
burning of draft cards.20 One need not even rely on expressive con­
duct to illustrate the point: Nazis in Skokie represent a kind of dis­
sent, yet the nature and context of this speech activity impose very 
high social costs on the community.21 The Supreme Court's rhetoric to 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971); West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 64042 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1940). 
16. For example, a group of people protesting the Nixon administration's efforts to 
avoid delivering Oval Office tape recordings to the Special Prosecutor were "dissenting" 
from the Executive Branch's policies, but arguably, cheering on the federal judiciary. See 
generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 {1974). Whether such speech constitutes dis­
sent depends on whether one views the question from the perspective of the Executive or 
Judicial Branch of the federal government. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 47-65 and accompanying text. 
18. Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 778, 784 (2000) (reviewing DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA). 
19. To his credit, Professor Carter openly acknowledges that wholly unacceptable acts 
of violence against the community arguably constitute a form of dissent. Pp. 60-61, 73-78, 
81-84. Even when government may constitutionally regulate expressive conduct, it may do 
so despite its communicative value and not because of it. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 376-77, 381-82 (1968). 
20. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (flag burning); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (draft card 
burning). 
21. See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th 
Cir. 1978), affg 477 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978); see also Ameri­
can Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-30 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the 
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the contrary notwithstanding, much contemporary First Amendment 
case law reflects direct cost/benefit analysis of proposed speech activ­
ity.Zf As Justice White once put the proposition, 
it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been ac­
cepted because it may be more appropriately generalized that within the 
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so over­
whelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no 
process of case-by-case adjudication is required.23 
It seems unlikely that the Justices would abandon such an approach in 
favor of a more absolute protection for speech activity denominated 
"dissent" (even if the definitional difficulties could be overcome, 
which is doubtful). 
These objections to a dissent-based theory of the First Amend­
ment do not, however, undermine the utility of Shiffrin's or Carter's 
efforts. Shiffrin's project constitutes a sustained effort to bring the 
free speech apostates (generally scholars of the Left) back into full 
communion with the free speech tradition. This is an important proj­
ect and should spark debate between the free speech doubters and be­
lievers. If the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran Church can 
resolve their theological differences and create the promise of a return 
to full communion,24 Shiffrin is right to push for a reconciliation be­
tween free speech traditionalists and the free speech critics. 
Professor Carter's emphasis on dissent serves a very different proj­
ect: empowering religious minorities within the larger political com­
munity. His work constitutes a sustained plea for more secular citi­
zens and policy makers to take seriously the concerns of religiously 
motivated dissenters.25 To the extent he suggests that the community, 
social costs of speech activity), summarily affirmed, 1001 U.S. 475 (1986); DELGADO & 
STEFANCIC, supra note 5, at 8-10, 32-37, 49-56, 126-28. 
22. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-54 (1983) (balancing employee speech on 
matters of public concern against the cost of disruption in a government workplace); Tinker 
v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509-14 (1969) (balancing student 
speech rights against the risk of "material and substantial" disruptions in the school); 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-82 (balancing burden on expressive conduct against achievement of 
"important" or "substantial" government objective via a narrow tailoring requirement); see 
also Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 671 (1983); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Tran­
scending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 141. 
23. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982); see also Vincent Blasi, The Patho­
logical Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 485 (1985) ("Of 
course, ad hoc balancing has long been an integral feature of first amendment doctrine for 
many types of disputes."). 
24. See Gustav Niebuhr, Vatican Settles A Historic Issue With Lutherans, N.Y. TIMEs, 
June 26, 1998, at Al; Peter Steinfels, After Four and a Half Centuries, Lutheran and Catholic 
Officials Affirm a Consensus On an Issue That Sparked the Protestant Reformation, N.Y. 
nMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at A13; Charles Trueheart, Faiths Heal Ancient Rifts Over Faith: 
Catholics, Lutherans End Doctrinal Dispute, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1999, at Al. 
25. See infra section III.C & Part IV. 
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always and unfailingly, owes religious extremists a careful and con­
cerned audience, he overstates the case of religiously motivated dis­
senters. On the other hand, to the extent that religiously motivated 
dissenters seek breathing room from the civil state in order to honor 
the dictates of conscience, Professor Carter offers a powerful argu­
ment for listening to what the dissenters have to say. 
I. DISSENT AS IDEOLOGY: DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE ROLE OF 
DISSENT IN PROGRESSIVE POLITICS 
Professor Shiffrin's work represents an effort to give leftists and 
progressives - often free speech critics - a reason to rethink their 
hostility to the free speech project. He offers both practical and philo­
sophical reasons for the doubters to return to the one true church: 
(1) "Like it or not, the free speech principle is here to stay" (p. 129). 
(2) "[T]here is insufficient reason to suppose that the left acts against its 
interests in supporting the free speech principle even assuming that 
the principle were laissez-faire .... To the extent that leftist politics 
depends on social movements and grassroots protests and activities, 
the free speech principle is vital" (p. 125). 
For reasons that I will develop more fully below, it is highly unlikely 
that the free speech critics will agree to rejoin the free speech congre­
gation. Moreover, free speech traditionalists are likely to balk at the 
compromises that Shiffrin proposes as an incentive for the free speech 
critics to renounce their heresies and embrace the free speech princi­
ple. 
A. Some Definitional Problems with Shiffrin's Vision of Dissent 
Before one evaluates Shiffrin's larger, and ambitious project, one 
must first meet and overcome two practical difficulties with Shiffrin's 
rather unusual definition of "dissent." The first is definitional and the 
second is operational.26 
1. Defining Dissent 
Shiffrin defines dissent, in large part, by reference to the identity of 
the speaker. · "By dissent, I mean speech that criticizes existing cus­
toms, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities" (p. xi). Even 
Soviet Russia ostensibly embraced constructive self-criticism (samok­
ritika );27 accordingly one would be hard pressed to object strenuously 
26. Frankly, these objections would likely apply to any dissent-based theory of free 
speech. In this sense, then, my objections are not unique to Shiffrin's theory. 
27. See ELLEN PROPPER MICKIEWICZ, MEDIA AND THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC 49, 67-68 
(1981). 
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to this baseline proposition, (i.e., so far so good). Of course defini­
tional issues abound with this definition of �'dissent" because the con­
cept is largely relational. Thus, almost immediately storm clouds be­
gin to form on the horizon: "Commercial advertisers, however, are 
not dissenters" (p. xii). Tobacco advertising, in particular, merits no 
special solicitude under Shiffrin's dissent-based vision of the First 
Amendment. Thus, it would seem that, under Shiffrin's theory, large 
corporate entities, such as tobacco companies, cannot engage in dis­
sent even if they 9ppose, the views of either the government or the 
general community. Dissent, for Shiffrin, appears to be the exclusive 
prerogative of disempowered cultural minorities who are victimized 
by the hierarchy and racism of the contemporary United States. Sim­
ply put, corporations need not apply. Corporate speech might have 
some communicative value, "but it does not deserve the full value that 
should be afforded to more classic instances of dissent."28 
2. Excluding Speakers Based on Viewpoint 
One might think that reactionary groups, like the Ku Klux Klan or 
John Birch Society, would fit the "more classic" paradigm of dissent. 
One would be mistaken. Although "[t]he Ku ;Klux Klan would also 
claim to be dissenters, social outcasts who challenge the foundations of 
the system ... the Klan arguably silenGes those who would otherwise 
be dissenters" (p. xii). Accordingly, "a focus on dissent in this context 
would not offer clear-cut guidance - which perhaps helps to explain 
why many see the hate speech issue as a difficult problem" (p. xii). 
Racist dissent "should be not a case for celebrating our glory as a na­
tion but an occasion for shame" (p. xiii) .. 
3. Dissent in Service of Ideology 
As this preliminary analysis shows, Professor Shiffrin's conception 
of dissent is rather one-sided. The flag-burning Gregory Johnson pre­
sents a paradigm of dissent; he is entitled to the broadest protections 
afforded under the Free Speech Clause (pp. 10-11 ). This is so because 
"[i]f we must have a 'central meaning' of the First Amendment, we 
28. P. xii. Professor Shiffrin does not attempt to distinguish between corporations en­
gaged in commercial speech and noncommercial speech: "I think it better to make decisions 
about the general category without resort to ad hoc decisions within it." P. 41. Theoreti­
cally, one could distinguish between corporations attempting to sell a product and corpora­
tions attempting to contribute to the process of democratic deliberation. Compare First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (invalidating a statute that prohibited 
corporations from making expenditures to influence vot�rs) with Central Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidating a regulation that 
banned a utility from advertising to promote use of electricity). Although the Supreme 
Court has recognized this distinction, Professor Shiffrin does not place any reliance upon it 
when developing his dissent-based model of free speech. See, e.g., p.119. 
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should recognize that the dissenters - those who attack existing cus­
toms, habits, traditions, and authorities - stand at the center of the 
First Amendment and not at its periphery" (p. 10). Once one moves 
from a disaffected leftist burning a flag to a disaffected rightist 
preaching race hatred, however, Shiffrin's commitment to dissent 
seems considerably weaker. 
For Professor Shiffrin, dissent serves the ends of progressive poli­
tics by empowering cultural and political minorities to challenge "in­
justice." "The dissent model assumes that in large-scale societies 
powerful interest groups and self-seeking politicians and bureaucrats 
are unavoidable" (p. 17). In consequence, "[ d]issenters and the dia­
logue that follows will always be necessary" (p. 17). "The value of dis­
sent, then, in this context is not that it fosters individual development 
or self-realization, or even that it exposes injustice and brings about 
change" (p. 18). Rather, it is a kind of "cultural glue" that binds the 
political community together. This is all well and good until we learn 
that this "cultural glue" does not provide any adhesive value to right­
wingers and corporate entities that are engaged in speech activity op­
posing official government policies that enjoy broad-based community 
support. 
In the context of commercial speech, Professor Shiffrin submits 
that "[c]ommercial advertisers are not dissenters" (p. 41). Because 
commercial advertisers "encourage people to consume products that 
cause needless death and suffering" (p. 48), they cannot assume the 
mantle of dissent.29 Here, we see the strongly content-laden conceptu­
alization of dissent that Professor Shiffrin proposes: 
Tobacco advertising is not an instance of the individual striking out 
against the current. Instead, it is an example of the powerful influencing 
the market rather than one of dissent by the less powerful. Tobacco ad­
vertising is no part of a social practice that challenges unjust hierarchies 
with the prospect of promoting progressive change. Thus, it may have 
some First Amendment value in the dissent mold, but it does not deserve 
the full value that should be afforded to more classic instances of dissent. 
[pp. 41-42] 
29. Some of these conclusions appear related to Professor Shiffrin's assumption that 
government enjoys a relatively free hand in regulating commercial speech. Pp. 33-37. For 
better or worse, Professor Shiffrin's efforts at prognostication have failed. Although it is 
true that Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 {1986), and Edge 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 509 U.S. 418 {1993), supported some of his assertions about government 
regulation of commercial speech, more recent cases indicate quite clearly that the tide has 
turned in favor of affording commercial speech remarkably broad First Amendment protec­
tion. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1923 {1999); City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 {1993). With each passing term, the Jus­
tices seem to be moving closer and closer to the position that commercial speech enjoys the 
same measure of First Amendment protection as noncommercial speech. See Alex Kozinski 
& Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 {1990). 
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This is a remarkable limitation on the scope of dissent, not just for 
commercial or corporate speakers, but for any person or entity whose 
speech fails to "challenge[] unjust hierarchies with the prospect of 
promoting progressive social change" (p. 42). This ideologically 
bound definition of dissent invites legislators and judges alike to pick 
free speech winners and losers based on both the identity of the 
speaker and the viewpoint of the speaker.30 
Unfortunately, this is not an aberrational statement. A few pages 
later, Shiffrin reports that "[t]he dissent perspective would argue that 
policies, prescriptions, and privileges of the elite need to be challenged 
on a regular basis by enough people to make a difference" (p. 45). 
Again, Shiffrin is openly associating dissent with a particular set of 
partisan or ideological outcomes. It is difficult to take such a theory 
very seriously, for it openly invites government censorship of disfa­
vored speakers (i.e., "elites," corporate entities such as tobacco com­
panies, and Neanderthal right-wingers spouting racist messages).31 In­
deed, this model of the dissent perspective has more in common with 
contemporary free speech jurisprudence in the People's Republic of 
China32 than in the United States: 
30. Ironically, Professor Shiffrin faults Professor Owen Fiss and other devotees of Pro­
fessor Alexander Meiklejohn's democratic deliberation model of free speech for inviting 
judicial personnel to make subjective decisions about whether speech activity encourages or 
facilitates democratic deliberation. Pp. 19-22. Shiffrin argues that, under the Fiss model, 
"[j]udges would be deciding on an ad hoc basis which issues need to be discussed on the na­
tional agenda and which have been comparatively marginalized." P. 20. Yet, if judges face 
such difficulties in deciding whether speech enhances or debases democratic deliberation, 
are they going to have any easier time deciding whether particular speech activity constitutes 
"dissent"? Moreover, Shiffrin's exclusion of corporate and right-wing speakers from his 
model of "dissent" embraces the exact sort of judicial subjectivity that he faults Fiss for em­
bracing. Professor Shiffrin cannot have it both ways: either judges are capable of fairly ex­
ercising discretion, or they are not. 
31. Indeed, if taken to its logical extreme, under Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory, the 
Republican Party and its candidates might not merit the broadest protections of the First 
Amendment to the extent that the party's platform fails to "challenge unjust hierarchies" (at 
least as defined or understood by Professor Shiffrin). After all, the Republican Party plat­
form opposes abortion on demand, supports minimalist government, opposes the welfare 
state, and generally supports tax relief for corporations and upper-income taxpayers - all 
policies unlikely to fit Shiffrin's definition of "dissent." Were the federal courts to embrace 
Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory, to the extent one opposes change, insufficiently advocates 
"progressive" change, or supports "hierarchy" of "the elite," one could claim only a reduced 
share in the protections afforded by the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. 
32. See XlANFA [Constitution] art. 3 (1982) ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China 
enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of dem­
onstration."); id. art. 51 ("The exercise by citizens . . .  of their freedoms . . . may not infringe 
upon the interests of the state, of society, or of the collective."); cf. Erik Eckholm, A Quiet 
Roar: China's Leadership Feels Threatened By a Sect Seeking Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
1999, at AlO; Seth Faison, Followers of Chinese Sect Defend Its Spiritual Goals, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 30, 1999, at A4; Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Reportedly Detains 2,000 Members of Falun 
Gong Sect, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at Al4; Cindy Sui, Falun Gong Holds Jail Hunger 
Strike; Sect Members Resist China's Crackdown, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2000, at A17. 
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[w]hen legislatures seek to regulate the speech of the powerful on 
grounds of political equality, a dissent perspective would not suggest that 
the courts should pull out a rubber stamp. On the other hand, courts 
should be generous in assessing such regulations because the legislature 
seeks to advance important constitutional goals. [p. 47] 
Thus, dissent is the exclusive prerogative of a speaker "challenging the 
insensitive exercise of power by a person she believes is carrying hier­
archy to excess," and "not a corporation hawking its wares or seeking 
to dominate the election process" (p. 48). 
This, of course, begs contemporary political reality. Tobacco com­
panies are in full retreat, and smokers are an increasingly marginalized 
and disfavored subgroup within the community. California has en­
acted taxes on the sale of tobacco products, with a portion of the reve­
nues generated used to fund advertising campaigns aimed at destroy­
ing the market for tobacco products.33 This principle of "tax and 
destroy" raises serious general First Amendment problems; if gov­
ernment may tax an entity to subsidize government speech aimed at its 
ultimate destruction, government essentially can monopolize the mar­
ketplace of ideas.34 A tobacco company engaged in speech activity 
protesting this arrangement seems squarely in the role of dissent and, 
moreover, would be defending important generic free speech princi­
ples.35 
33. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30,121-30,130 {West 1994) {also known as "Propo­
sition 99"); Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360, 1362-67 
{Cal. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of Proposition 99); see also RICHARD KLUGER, 
ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTES w AR 703-05 {1996); Paul A. 
LeBel, "Of Deaths Put On By Cunning and Forced Cause": Reality Bites the Tobacco 
Industry, 38 WM. & MARYL. REV. 605, 635-47 {1997) {reviewing STANTON A. GLANTZ ET 
AL., THE CIGARETIE PAPERS (1996), PHILLIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN {1996), and 
KLUGER, supra). Massachusetts and Arizona followed California's lead, enacting schemes 
taxing tobacco products and using the funds to provide health care services and also adver­
tising campaigns aimed at driving smoking out of existence. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
42-3251 to -3253 {West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 2xx {Supp. 1999); ch. 64C, § 7C 
{1998). 
34. See EMERSON, supra note 11, at 697-716; MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT 
SPEAKS: PoLmcs, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA {1983); John E. 
Nowak, Using the Press Clause to Limit Government Speech, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 {1988); 
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 589-95 (1980); William W. Van 
Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the 
United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530 (1966); Edward 
H. Ziegler, Jr., Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 
21 B.C. L. REV. 578, 614-17 {1980); Jay S. Bloom, Comment, Unconstitutional Government 
Speech, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 815 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Municipal Advo­
cacy in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535 {1980); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Talking to Each Other: Reflections on Yudofs When Government Speaks, 1984 WIS. L. 
REV. 129 {book review); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). But cf. 
Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1990) (stating that government officials can legiti­
mately be expected to express the views of the majority of their constituents). 
35. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 589 {1996); see also Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good For 
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Turning to racist speech, Professor Shiffrin straightforwardly re­
jects hate speech as an integral member of the dissent family. "In my 
view, the argument that First Amendment values (such as truth, 
autonomy, self-expression, and liberty) dictate that racist speech can­
not be regulated is ultimately indefensible,' (p. 50). Given the exclu­
sion of commercial speech from the universe of "dissent," this is 
hardly a surprising move. Shiffrin ultimately questions the utility of 
hate speech regulation, not because such regulations violate the First 
Amendment, but rather because "the racist character of our society" 
probably would make such regulations ineffective at protecting the in­
terests of racial and cultural minorities (pp. 50, 80-86). 
In Shiffrin's view, hate speech should not be protected "to safe­
guard the liberty of the speaker or because it is valuable" (p. 85). Be­
cause "dissent" is intrinsically valuable and lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment, a careful reader must conclude that hate speech, in Shif­
frin's view, does not constitute "dissent." The government should not 
proscribe such speech only because "American society may be so 
thoroughly racist that nontargeted racist speech regulations would be 
counterproductive" (p. 85). Shiffrin takes pains to emphasize that if 
his cost/benefit analysis proves to be wrong, "I would presently sup­
port punitive measures against public instances of racial vilification 
even when not targeted against individuals. "36 
Plainly, Professor Shiffrin's viewpoint-based definition of dissent 
leads to some deeply counterintuitive results: although both Ward 
Connerly and Clarence Thomas are members of a historically disem­
powered racial minority, they arguably are not engaged in "dissent" 
when they take positions that do not combat "injustice" or "challenge 
unjust hierarchies" (at least as some would define those terms ).37 
Likewise, although David Duke and Matthew Hale espouse racist 
viewpoints rejected by most citizens,38 they too are not engaged in dis­
sent because their speech potentially silences disempowered minori­
ties. Presumably, minorities who espouse racist or anti-Semitic view­
points, such as Louis Farrakhan or Leonard Jeffries, also are not 
"dissenters." 
General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 235 (1998). 
36. P. 85. In addition, Professor Shiffrin endorses providing tort remedies to the victims 
of targeted hate speech. Pp. 80-87, 161 n.161. 
37. Of course, Mr. Connerly and Justice Thomas undoubtedly would claim that their 
professional efforts are aimed precisely at "challenging unjust hierarchies" and facilitating 
"progressive" change. Professor Shiffrin's strongly left-leaning definitions of "progress" and 
"challenging hierarchy" are contestable and undoubtedly would be contested if his dissent 
theory ever gained any ground in the federal courts. 
38. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text; see also Christi Parsons, White Separa­
tist Denied Law License, CHI. TRm., Feb. 9, 1999, § N, at 1 (describing the Illinois Bar Asso­
ciation's decision to refuse admission to Matthew Hale because of his support of racist view­
points and organizations, including the World Church of the Creator). 
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Historically, the Supreme Court has placed viewpoint neutrality at 
the very core of the First Amendment.39 Government attempts to take 
sides based on a speaker's position on a given issue of the day are pre­
sumptively unconstitutional.40 Even when speech is otherwise pro­
scribable, government may not pick and choose among speakers based 
on viewpoint.41 Shiffrin's vision of the First Amendment does not ap­
pear to be viewpoint neutral, because a speaker's ability to claim the 
full protection of the First Amendment is, at least in some circum­
stances, contingent on the substance of the speaker's message. Nor is 
his definition of dissent speaker neutral - a speaker's characteristics 
might define whether or not she (or it) can lay claim to the strongest 
protections of the First Amendment. For example, no matter what the 
issue, commercial enterprises cannot engage in dissent.42 
This certainly represents a new twist on First Amendment theory. 
Governments historically have cared less about the identity of a 
speaker than the content of a speaker's message. Hence, in the early 
part of the twentieth century, a person advocating the necessity of a 
proletarian revolution faced official censorship and punishment for 
advocating such ideas.43 More recently, those espousing views sympa­
thetic to Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism have faced persecution for 
their ideological commitments.44 The identity of the speaker was quite 
39. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 {1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 414-1.6 {1989); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 {1982) {plurality 
opinion); Kingsley Int'! Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 {1959); Niemotko v. 
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 {1951). 
40. See Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 {1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 {1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S 116, 132, 136-37 
{1966); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 11-
13, 167-71, 239-40 {1993). 
41. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 {1992); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. 
v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 n.20 {1996); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 878-80 
{1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
42. Consider, for example, Benetton's recent and controversial advertising campaign 
featuring death row inmates. See Stuart Elliot, Benetton Ads Offer Tour of Death Row, N.Y. 
nMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at CB; Hank Stuever, Radical Chic: Benetton Takes On the Death 
Penalty, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2000, § C, at 1. Although Benetton undoubtedly wishes to 
sell clothing, it is difficult to understand why this speech activity should not be deemed "dis­
sent." Cf. p. 41 {"There is a serious question whether judges should be asked to make ad 
hoc decisions about whether particular advertisements are or are not dissenting. I think it 
better to make decisions about the general category without resort to ad hoc decisions within 
it."). 
43. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 {1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
{1925); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 {1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 
{1919). Even celebrated labor leaders fell victinl to the government's censorial appetites. 
See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 {1919). 
44. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589 {1967); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 {1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 
354 U.S. 234 {1957); Dennis v. United States, 341U.S. 494 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Comm. v. McGrath, 341U.S. 123 {1951). 
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irrelevant to the analysis; membership in a particular social or cultural 
minority would not affect the outcome of a case. Eleanor Roosevelt 
stood on the same First Amendment ground as Marcus Garvey or J. 
Edgar Hoover. 
A speaker-based theory of the First Amendment seems deeply 
problematic. As a practical matter, if the United States is as pro­
foundly racist as Shiffrin suggests (pp. xii-xiii, 76-87), it is difficult to 
imagine police, prosecutors, courts, and jurors applying a speaker­
based vision of the First Amendment in a just fashion (although some 
might suggest that the task itself is inherently unjust). One might 
think that, assuming Shiffrin's assertions about the unremittingly racist 
nature of the contemporary United States are true, the opportunity to 
make vindication of speech rights contingent on the identity of the 
speaker would leave minority culture speakers less well off than they 
are under current First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the proj­
ect of viewpoint neutrality is meant to ensure that unpopular speakers 
are not censored simply because the speaker's message offends the 
dominant forces within the community. Speech regulations must be 
viewpoint neutral precisely because police, prosecutors, judges, and 
jurors are highly likely to hold strong preexisting opinions about the 
proper ordering of the community. To counter this trend, reviewing 
courts require the government to censor all speakers or censor none. 
Moreover, with respect to public property, the government may cen­
sor speakers only through viewpoint neutral, reasonable time, place, 
and manner regulations45 and, with respect to private property, the 
government may proscribe speech only when the speech raises a clear 
and present danger of imminent lawlessness.46 
B. More General Problems with a Dissent-Based Model 
of Free Speech 
Even if one were to reject Shiffrin's troubling definition of dissent, 
a more generalized dissent-based model of the First Amendment 
would still present serious operational difficulties. Whether speech 
constitutes dissent is a highly subjective matter. Suppose, for example, 
that a street protestor supports a national missile defense but opposes 
the deployment of the Patriot missile? Is such a person engaged in 
dissent against the government's defense policies, or is such a person 
effectively supporting the government? Undoubtedly, different peo­
ple would characterize the speech in divergent ways, depending on 
45. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); United States v. Grace, 
461U.S. 171, 177-78 (1983); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951); Hague v. CIO, 
307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). 
46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969). 
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whether they viewed the Patriot missile as an essential component of 
the government's defense program. 
It really should not matter whether the speech effectively supports 
or opposes contemporary government defense policy. If the speech 
relates to an issue of public concern about which the government must 
establish and enforce a policy, then the speech should enjoy the most 
robust protection that the First Amendment can afford.47 Judges 
should not attempt to engage in a preliminary characterization of the 
speech as "dissent" or "non-dissent" to determine the burden on the 
government in suppressing the speech activity.48 
The problem of identifying dissent is infinitely more difficult than 
this preliminary analysis would suggest. The "government" is not a 
monolithic entity. For example, the Reagan Administration opposed 
the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade49 and consistently urged 
the Supreme Court to overrule this precedent. On the anniversary of 
Roe, President Reagan regularly spoke, via telephone, at a pro-life 
rally held in Lafayette Park, directly across the street from the White 
House.50 The protestors opposed the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe, 
viewing it as a condonation of murder, a position embraced by the Ex­
ecutive Branch of the federal government (through the Department of 
Justice and the President himself).51 Were these pro-life protestors 
47. See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 9, at 22-27; Emerson, supra note 14, at 
882-86; Kalven, supra note 7, at 205-13. 
48. One might suggest that any speech the government seeks to suppress constitutes dis­
sent. Although this definitional fix has some superficial appeal, it really would not solve the 
problem. Government regulations regarding the use of public property for speech activity 
are often generic- whether one can use a particular park or street for speech activity is not 
contingent on the message one seeks to propagate. See Clark v. Community For Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). Accordingly, limitations on speech activity might well 
apply to persons wishing to support some aspect of government policy. 
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
50. See Ruth Marcus & Victoria Churchville, Antiabortion March Nears; Protestors Ar­
rive By the Busload, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1985, at Al; Ruth Marcus & Steven Heilbronner, 
"Reagan to Address Abortion Foes, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1985, at Al; Robin Toner, Rally 
Against Abortion Hears Pledge of Support By Reagan, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at AlO 
[hereinafter Toner, Rally Against Abortion]; Robin Toner, Reagan Exhorts Foes of Abortion 
at Capital Rally, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1986, at D25 [hereinafter Toner, Reagan Exhorts]. Af­
ter succeeding President Reagan, President Bush continued the Reagan Administration's 
abortion policies. See Steven V. Roberts, "Nominee of Bush's ls Said to Oppose Banning 
Abortion, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, at Al: 
Mr. Bush pleased opponents of abortion today when he spoke by telephone to a rally pro­
testing the Roe v. Wade decision and made one of his strongest statements to date on the 
highly emotional issue. "I know there are people of good will who disagree, but after years 
of sober and serious reflection on the issue, this is what I think . .. . I think the Supreme 
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade was wrong and should be overturned." 
51. At various times, President Reagan vowed to "end this national tragedy," Toner, 
Rally Against Abortion, supra note 50, and pledged to "continue to work together with 
members of Congress to overturn the tragedy of Roe v. Wade," Toner, Reagan Exhorts, su­
pra note 50. Moreover, Reagan emphasized that the Executive Branch had decreased the 
incidence of abortion by "restrict[ing] the use of Federal funds to perform abortion" and by 
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engaged in dissent, or merely supporting the position of the federal 
government? The answer depends on whether or not one views the 
question from the perspective of the federal judiciary rather than the 
Oval Office. 
Undoubtedly, protecting dissent is an important function of the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court 
routinely has indicated that this is so.52 Accordingly, Shiffrin's desire 
to build a free speech framework on the construct of dissent is per­
fectly understandable. Given the definitional and operational difficul­
ties, however, dissent is better protected through a project of strict 
viewpoint neutrality. 
Because of the potential for bias in any system of free speech pro­
tection contingent on the characterization of speech by government 
officials, requiring that all speech be treated equally serves as a far 
better means of effectively protecting dissent than a theory that invites 
would-be government censors to make the protection of speech to 
some degree contingent on a label easily withheld because of antipa­
thy toward the message (or the messenger). Prohibiting the govern­
ment from officially taking sides on questions of the day and then si­
lencing all opposition best ensures that contrary voices are heard. 
Take, for example, anti-abortion protesters. It is difficult to 
imagine a viable dissent-based model of the First Amendment that 
would not encompass this group. Survey data show that a clear ma­
jority of U.S. citizens believe abortion should be legal, at least in some 
circumstances.53 At the same time, a substantial plurality of citizens 
view unborn fetuses as possessing personhood from conception and, 
therefore, the destruction of a fetus as a form of murder.54 President 
Clinton and Congress, unsurprisingly, have sided with the majority, 
enacting laws that, as applied by some federal and state courts, se­
verely restrict the ability of anti-abortion protesters to engage in 
peaceful anti-abortion protests outside abortion clinics.55 The federal 
"den[ying] Government funds to organizations overseas that perform or promote abortion." 
Toner, Rally Against Abortion, supra note 50. 
52 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
53. See Carey Goldberg & Janet Elder, Public Still Backs Abortion But Wants Limits, 
Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al; Andrew M. Greeley, How Do Catholics Vote?: 
Not As Pawns of the Church, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1984, at E21. Father Greeley reports 
that even clear majorities of Roman Catholics do not oppose abortion under all circum­
stances. See id. 
54. See Goldberg & Elder, supra note 53; see also Pamela Constable & John W. 
Fountain, Abortion Foes in Grim Profusion: Protest Marks 25th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade 
Decision, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1998, at Bl. 
55. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 
694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)). Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have sus­
tained the Access Act against First Amendment challenges. See American Life League, Inc. 
v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 
F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995). 
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judiciary generally has blessed this legislation and endorsed the crea­
tive use of injunctions to restrain protestors who are communicating 
messages to women attempting to enter and leave abortion service 
providers.56 In short, the full power of the federal government has 
been brought to bear against pro-life, anti-abortion protestors who 
wish to demonstrate outside abortion clinics. 
Whether or not one agrees with the pro-life movement's assertions 
about the nature of unborn human fetuses, these protestors are plainly 
engaged in a form of dissent. Moreover, this dissent is highly un­
popular, in part because of the crude methods often utilized by the 
anti-abortion protestors (e.g., the use of graphic depictions of aborted 
fetuses and other ghastly props in making their point). Shiffrin never 
mentions anti-abortion protestors as a model of dissent. Indeed, given 
his speaker- and viewpoint-based limitations on what constitutes "dis­
sent," it is far from certain that they would even meet his definition.57 
Of course, one might object that it is also far from certain that the 
protestors will fare any better under the viewpoint-neutrality project. 
A law that prohibits all persons from engaging in speech activity 
within so many feet of an abortion clinic restricts the speech activities 
of all persons without regard to their viewpoint on abortion. This ig­
nores the reality that pro-life demonstrators are far more likely to en­
gage in protest activity outside abortion clinics than pro-choice activ­
ists. The facially neutral restriction cuts more deeply against one side 
of the debate, and does so quite intentionally in consideration of the 
rights of those seeking to enter and leave family planning clinics.58 
This does not demonstrate the failure of the viewpoint-neutrality 
project so much as the failure of the federal judiciary to apply First 
Amendment principles to a group of very unpopular protestors who 
engage in discourse that is highly offensive to many persons within the 
community. In any event, it does not seem likely that anti-abortion 
protestors would fare any better under a free speech regime vesting 
56. See Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 
U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474, 479-88 (1988); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. 
American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999); see also Lawson v. 
Murray, 119 S. Ct. 387 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of cert.); Williams v. Planned 
Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.); Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of cert.). 
57. Suppose that the anti-abortion protestors were all heterosexual, upper-middle class, 
caucasian males, employed by a non-profit corporation whose officers oppose abortion on 
demand (for example, priests and lay members of the Roman Catholic Church). Given that 
this group does not suffer the ill effects of the pervasive racism and patriarchy Shiffrin be­
lieves to plague the contemporary United States, a district court judge utilizing Shiffrin's dis­
sent theory might well deny the protestors the full protection of the First Amendment. 
58. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The 
Peculiar Use of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 100-15 (1978) (arguing 
that subject matter restrictions, although facially neutral, often mask official antipathy to­
ward particular messages and speakers and, therefore, should be viewed skeptically). 
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judges with the ability to pick and choose speakers based on either the 
content of their messages or the demographic and economic makeup 
of their groups. 
C. Shiffrin's Defense and Its Shortcomings 
Shiffrin anticipates the objection that his theory is viewpoint, and 
perhaps speaker based: "To be sure, some might accuse my analysis 
of tracking my political preferences too closely, so that left-wing dis­
senters get protected while people I do not like (corporations and 
right-wingers) do not" (p. 129). This disclaimer appears on the penul­
timate page of the book and scarcely recalibrates the preceding 128 
pages, in which Shiffrin consistently defines "dissent" in terms of the 
ideological perspective of the speaker: dissent constitutes speech ac­
tivity by the less powerful challenging the more powerful to redress 
"injustice" (rather a value-laden concept, not to put too fine a point on 
the matter) (pp. xi-xiii, 10-12, 17-18, 20, 41-42, 45, 47-48, 75-76, 80, 85, 
91-93, 112, 120). Having consistently defined the free speech project 
in value-laden, ideological terms, a disclaimer on the next to the last 
page really does not present much of a counterweight. 
Nevertheless, Professor Shiffrin maintains: "In an important 
sense, however, this accusation is wrongheaded. Rules under my ap­
proach are fashioned to protect dissent without regard to the politics 
of the dissenters" (p. 129). This simply is not so, at least with respect 
to openly racist speakers like Matthew Hale and the World Church of 
the Creator: 
Because both aggressors and victims can be characterized, with some ac­
curacy, as dissenters, the dissent story underscores the difficulty of the 
First Amendment status of racist speech. On the one hand, the dissent 
perspective seeks to protect those with popularly disdained views and, in 
an important respect, this includes those who publicly express racist 
views. On the other hand, the dissent perspective seeks to assure that 
those who are out of power or lower in a hierarchy have the means to 
protest their status and to combat the inevitable abuses of power by 
higher-ups. A regime that is blind to the importance of assuring that dis­
advantaged groups are not intimidated will contain, as its status quo, sub­
stantial corruption and abuse. [p. 77] 
Plainly, Shiffrin is saying that Matthew Hale and David Duke are 
not entitled to the same level of free speech protection as Jesse 
Jackson or Hillary Rodham Clinton. Just in case there might be doubt 
about this, Shiffrin later emphasizes that "my contention should be 
clear. I am not arguing that racist speech should be protected to safe­
guard the liberty of the speaker or because it is valuable" (p. 85). As 
to the Ku Klux Klan, for instance, "the Klan says in public what many 
millions of white individuals think or come close to thinking in pri­
vate" (p. xii), hence the Klan's message is, at best, a redundancy. 
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Moreover, the Klan "silences those who would otherwise be dissent­
ers" (p. xii). In consequence, "a focus on dissent in this context would 
not offer clear-cut guidance" (p. xii), meaning that the Klan's speech 
activities do not constitute "dissent" for purposes of Professor 
Shiffrin's theory of the Free Speech Clause. 
Nor is Professor Shiffrin's objection to censoring racist speech re­
lated to "a chilling effect in the marketplace of ideas (though some 
marginally valuable speech could be lost); nor . . .  the vagueness of 
working out standards case by case (though vagueness is of course not 
a virtue)" (p. 85). Thus, dissenters who oppose workplace speech 
regulations, or affirmative action programs, or equal civil or political 
rights for racial minorities are outside Shiffrin's dissent-based model of 
the First Amendment - their opposition to the existing status quo 
may be discounted, because it is offered in support of a political 
agenda inconsistent with Shiffrin's notions of redressing "injustice." 
Indeed, such speech can be seen as seeking to increase the frequency 
of racial injustice in the United States. 
Racist dissent merits protection only because efforts to eradicate 
such speech through government regulation might backfire. Shiffrin 
tells us that "[i]f I thought such regulation would be effective on bal­
ance in combating racism, I would presently support punitive meas­
ures against public instances of racial vilification even when not tar­
geted against individuals" (p. 85). He limits this proposal only by 
noting that he would abandon this position if "[p]eople of color . . .  
think that the tangible benefits of deterrence and the symbolic impor­
tance of this legislation outweigh the speculative possibilities of non­
deterrence, evasion, and increased racial hostility; that, in short, the 
advantages of taking a stand outweigh the costs."59 
Given Shiffrin's absolute exclusion of racist speech from his con­
cept of "dissent," one must conclude that, his assertion to the contrary 
notwithstanding, his theory of free speech is viewpoint-based. A 
viewpoint-neutral, dissent-based theory of the First Amendment 
59. P. 85. One wonders how a federal district court judge would go about ascertaining 
the answer to this question. After all, it seems doubtful that all members of a given racial 
minority group would share identical views on the desirability of hate speech regulation -
such a proposition is highly essentialist. See Carter, p. 69 ("Now, you might have noticed my 
use of the term 'black community.' Let me make clear that I do not claim - and I do not 
believe - that there exists an identifiable set of black 'meanings,' as there often is, for ex­
ample, in a religious community; that is, I do not believe in the existence of such a thing as 
the 'black point of view.' "). Moreover, it also seems likely that different racial minority 
groups might have different attitudes about hate speech regulation. Does Shiffrin mean 
that, if a bare majority of a given racial group supported hate speech regulation, it should be 
deemed both constitutional and desirable? What about those who dissent from this point of 
view within the minority group? The problem seems hopelessly complex and, therefore, the 
suggestion that government simply should defer to the wishes of racial minorities is not par­
ticularly helpful. Cf. Carter, p. 69 ("So I am not in that sense an essentialist, and I quiver 
whenever smart professors who should know better assert that there is a unique 'black per­
spective' (which they, of course, are uniquely able to identify)."). 
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would extend the strongest protections of the Free Speech Clause to 
all speech in opposition to existing government programs and policies 
- even if the opposition seems terribly wrongheaded, misguided, or 
hate-inspired. Such dissent merits protection not because the general 
community derives substantial benefits from these proposals, but be­
cause a government empowered to silence racist dissenters is equally 
empowered to silence progressive dissenters.60 
Indeed, given Shiffrin's repeated assertion that "American society 
may be so thoroughly racist that nontargeted racist speech regulations 
would be counterproductive" (p. 85), not to mention his earlier asser­
tion that "our country is racist to the core" (p. xiii), one wonders why 
he would trust the presumably racist government to enforce hate 
speech codes in a fair and even-handed fashion. Professor Nadine 
Strossen has reported that Canada's experiment in regulating "de­
grading" erotic speech has not stopped the flow of "mainstream" het­
erosexual pornography into the country, but has led to the censorship 
of gay and lesbian erotica.61 Simply put, the average male, heterosex-
60. Shiffrin's doctrinal defense of hate-speech regulation also merits a brief mention. 
Professor Shiffrin mounts an extended attack on both Justice Scalia's majority opinion and 
Justice White's concurring opinion in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Pp. 51-
76. His basic objection rests on the idea that existing free speech jurisprudence already 
makes a number of important distinctions based on the content of speech activity. Pp. 57-58. 
Citing to commercial speech cases, Shiffrin argues that "point-of-view" discrinlination is a 
permissible feature of government speech regulation in some circumstances and, given this 
state of affairs, _regulations subjecting racist points of view to civil or crinlinal liability should 
be sustained against First Amendment objections. P. 57-63. Later on, Shiffrin shifts his 
ground and characterizes Justice Scalia's objection to the St. Paul ordinance as a problem 
involving content discrinlination. See pp. 57-67. Essentially, Shiffrin uses the concepts of 
"point-of-view" discrinlination and "content discrimination" interchangeably. Of course, 
viewpoint-based discrinlination and content-based discrinlination are not the same thing. 
A local ordinance permitting candidates for public office - but not commercial adver­
tisers - to place signs on utility polls owned by the city would constitute content discrimina­
tion. Contemporary free speech jurisprudence generally permits government to regulate 
different kinds of speech activity differently, although this is not universally the case. See, 
e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419-21, 430-31 (1993) 
(striking down a ban on commercial news racks, noting blurred distinction between com­
mercial and other speech); William Van Alstyne, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some 
Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1638-48 (1996) (noting a 
recent trend to treat commercial speech like any other speech). Viewpoint-based discrimi­
nation, on the other hand, picks and chooses free speech winners and losers within a par­
ticular kind of speech activity. For example, a municipal ordinance permitting Proposition 
200 supporters to place signs on city-owned utility polls but denying the same permission to 
Proposition 200 opponents would constitute viewpoint-based discrinlination. The govern­
ment would be picking a preferred point of view from within the marketplace of ideas and 
advancing this viewpoint through its sovereign powers. R.A. V. involved an ordinance that 
mandated both viewpoint-based discrinlination and content discrinlination. See R.A. V., 505 
U.S. at 391-95. This makes all the difference in the world for purposes of free speech analy­
sis. 
61. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND 
THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 234-44 (1995); see also Mary Williams Walsh, Chill Hits 
Canada's Porn Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at Al (describing government raid of a les­
bian bookstore). 
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ual Canadian customs agent does not find Penthouse or Hustler unduly 
offensive (or "degrading") but does find Robert Mapplethorpe's pho­
tographs sufficiently "degrading" to justify official government sup­
pression. 
Shiffrin never comes to terms with the inherent contradiction of 
positing a society that devalues and disrespects cultural and political 
minorities with a free speech doctrine that invites the state to pick free 
speech winners and losers. To be fair, his defense of free speech 
against postmodern critics rests on the idea that marginalized political 
groups obtain needed breathing room through the exercise of free 
speech rights. "To the extent that leftist politics depends on social 
movements and grassroots protests and activities, the free speech 
principle is vital" (p. 125). In the absence of the free speech principle, 
"government could squelch antiwar protesters and civil rights protes­
tors. "62 The problem is that Shiffrin's refusal to credit right-wing and 
corporate speech activity as dissent opens up the very real possibility 
of government censorship of liberal or progressive speech activity.63 
Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly recognizes these seeds of contradic­
tion in his argument. His project is not so much to convert the free 
speech absolutists, but the free speech critics coming from the New 
Left.64 By attempting to marginalize the free speech prerogatives of 
reactionaries and corporations, he makes the free speech principle po­
tentially more attractive to the postmodern critics. This is, of course, a 
difficult tightrope to walk.65 
62. P. 125; see also Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Watts v. United States, 
394 U.S. 705 (1969); Bond v. Flogel, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 
(1963); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). 
63. See STROSSEN, supra note 61, at 222-24 (describing the widespread use of hate 
speech regulations to silence racial minorities and women for speech critical of the dominant 
culture). Professor Strossen reports that, under the University of Michigan speech code, 
"there were more than twenty cases of whites charging blacks with racist speech." Id. at 223. 
Moreover, "the only two instances in which the rule was invoked to sanction racist speech 
(as opposed to other forms of hate speech) involved punishment of speech by or on behalf of 
black students." Id.; see also Strossen, supra note 6, at 506-07, 556-59 ("The general lesson 
that rules banning hate speech will be used to punish minority group members has proven 
true in the specific context of campus hate speech regulations."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Res­
urrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 987 (1995) ("Using the state to change cul­
ture before power in an unequal world can often backfire, for example, if speech codes are 
applied to students of color, or antipornography laws to gay erotica."). But cf. Lawrence, 
supra note 5, at 450 n.82 (arguing that hate speech regulations should not be applied to pro­
tect members of the "dominant majority groups"). 
64. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text. 
65. Evidently, at least one member of the Critical Race Theory movement has been en­
ticed by Professor Shiffrin's efforts to vest a greater share of the First Amendment's stock 
with cultural minorities favoring progressive causes. See Delgado, supra note 18, at 779 
("Steven Shriffin's Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America is a welcome addition to 
this emerging 'First Amendment legal realism' vein of scholarship."). 
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D. The Social Costs of Speech Activity Do Not Necessarily Track 
Viewpoint or Content 
Even if the considerable definitional difficulties could be overcome 
successfully, a dissent-based model of the First Amendment would still 
not work. To put the matter plainly, the social costs of speech activity 
do not necessarily correlate with whether the speech constitutes "dis­
sent" (however defined). Indeed, the bombing of the Oklahoma City 
federal building arguably constituted the most powerful statement of 
dissent in the last decade. To that, one might add Theodore 
Kaczynski's mail bomb letters to the purveyors of technology and the 
anti-abortion zealots' murders of abortion clinic personnel.66 
Shiffrin might respond that acts of violence do not constitute 
speech activity, but rather criminal conduct, and therefore do not con­
stitute dissent.67 Fair enough. The point still remains that the groups 
most likely to engage in dissent also impose some of the highest costs 
on the community. 
Consider, for example, Matthew Hale and the World Church of 
the Creator. Hale and his church preach a brand of white supremacy 
that is highly destructive of building and maintaining a viable plural­
istic community.68 Indeed, his racist tracts motivated Benjamin Smith 
to go on a multi-state rampage, murdering two minorities and 
wounding nine others in the process.69 
The official policy of the United States government is to promote 
and secure the full civil rights of all persons. The policy appears in 
myriad federal laws and regulations and enjoys the support of all ma-
66. For a list of the physicians and staff members murdered and wounded since 1993, 
see Michael A. Fletcher, Sniper Kills Abortion Doctor Near Buffalo, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 
1998, at Al. Since Dr. David Gunn's murder on March 10, 1993, in Pensacola, Florida, anti­
abortion protestors have killed five additional clinic personnel and wounded yet another 
five. See id. "Since 1977, there have been over 1,700 attacks against abortion providers, ac­
cording to the National Abortion Federation." Id. 
67. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
68. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, How Did the Creator Become A White Racist?, 
CHI. TRIB., July 18, 1999, at Cl?; Kirsten Scharnberg, A Gospel of Hatred, CHI. TRIB., July 
11, 1999, at Cl. Professor Ruether believes that, rather than affording racist churches a re­
spectful hearing, Christians of good will 
need to take responsibility for more mainstream patterns of thought that feed racist extrem­
ism: namely belief in a God who ordered creation as a hierarchy that sacralizes the power of 
dominant groups over others, who favors some nations and religions against others and who 
mandates war and violence as a way to establish God's reign on Earth. 
69. See Edward Walsh, Midwest Gun Spree Suspect ls Dead, WASH. POST, July 5, 1999, 
at Al; Edward Walsh, Racial Slayer Killed Himself in Struggle, WASH. POST, July 6, 1999, at 
Al; see also Eric Bailey, 2 Brothers Indicted in Synagogue Fires, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2000, 
at Al9 (describing the various acts of terror James Tyler Williams and Benjamin Matthew 
Williams have committed against Jews, racial minorities, and homosexuals, including arson 
and murder, all in the name of maintaining and enforcing "biblical law"). 
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jor political parties. No serious mainstream person in contemporary 
American politics advocates conditioning the civil rights or liberties of 
citizens on race. Consequently, Hale and his followers have placed 
themselves in opposition to the official position of the government; 
they are engaged in dissent. 
Whether or not courts openly admit the practice, they routinely 
engage in utilitarian cost/benefit analyses when deciding free speech 
claims.70 Hence, indecent erotic speech enjoys less First Amendment 
protection than a candidate's stump speech under the theory that the 
community reaps greater benefits from the latter than the former and, 
accordingly, the government enjoys less of an ability to restrict politi­
cal speech than non-obscene erotica.71 
Some of the most costly speech activity constitutes dissent.72 This 
does not necessarily mean that government should enjoy a relatively 
free hand in censoring the speech of unpopular political minorities, 
but it does suggest that the problem of hate speech requires more than 
simply determining whether or not the speaker is engaged in dissent 
and, if so, letting the speaker have his say. 
In fact, Shiffrin largely abandons his focus on dissent when dis­
cussing the problem of hate speech. In rather direct terms, he advo­
cates a kind of utilitarian calculus in determining whether or not to tax 
the costs of such speech activity against the community in order to fa­
cilitate the speech activities of hate mongers: "The basic problem with 
the autonomy argument [in favor of protecting hate speech] is that it 
cannot show that the value of individual autonomy outweighs the 
harm caused by racist speech" (p. 79). Shiffrin also questions whether 
"the idea of respect for persons demands any particular weighing of 
the competing values in this context," and concludes that "[a]ny confi­
dence that the value of free speech in this context outweighs the harm 
requires placing a thumb on the scales" (p. 79). 
70. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (carving out an exception 
to the Miller obscenity test in order to allow regulation of child pornography). But cf. Blasi, 
supra note 23, at 485 ("The realistic goal must be to contain such balancing, not eliminate it; 
even Justice Black recognized in disputes over the timing and location of demonstrations an 
appropriate sphere for a case-by-case judicial comparison of communicative and regulatory 
interests."). 
71. Compare Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), and City of 
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), 
and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
72. See Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 916, 916-19 {1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from de­
nial of cert.) (giving the history of the Skokie case, which involved a Nazi march through a 
Jewish community); see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Re­
calibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1165 {2000); Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and 
Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 {1982) (reviewing ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING 
MY ENEMY {1979)). 
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This practical cost/benefit analysis makes a great deal more sense 
than application of a reflexive "dissent = protected speech" calculus. 
Because the social costs of hate speech are so great, courts should 
weigh carefully whether the benefit to the project of democratic delib­
eration justifies absorbing the corrosive effects of hate speech.73 As 
Professor Richard Delgado has put the matter, "A realist approach 
would regard both · individual and social costs and benefits as daily 
weighing in the balance."74 In consequence, such a theory "would deal 
with both the effects of hate speech on the life of a single individual as 
well as its impact across large groups."75 
In this regard, it bears noting that virtually all Western democra­
cies have adopted hate speech codes - including Canada, France, and 
Germany. Those nations have performed the cost/benefit analysis and 
concluded that the potential harm associated with hate speech out­
weighs its potential social value. Thus, in Canada, a candidate calling 
for a race war would find himself in jail, not on the ballot.76 
Given the consensus in other industrial democracies, that hate 
speech constitutes a social harm worthy of proscription, Shiffrin's utili­
tarian approach has much to recommend it. He also reaches a defen­
sible result: hate speech should be protected not because it is intrinsi­
cally socially valuable, but rather, because government is incapable of 
fairly administering a speech code. Rather than using the rhetorical 
shell of "dissent," Shiffrin would have advanced his case more con­
vincingly if he simply had made a direct argument for social 
cost/benefit analysis in contemporary free speech jurisprudence.77 
II. DISSENTING FROM SHIFFRIN'S VISION OF DISSENT 
Even a sympathetic reader will find it difficult to overlook a fun­
damental objection to Professor Shiffrin's theory of the First Amend-
73. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 307-08 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The 
vulnerability of various forms of communication to community control must be propor­
tioned to their impact upon other community interests."); see also Beauhamais v. Illinois, 
343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a criminal conviction based on Beauhamais distributing rac­
ist leaflets on the streets of Chicago, Illinois, under an Illinois statute prohibiting group li­
bel). 
74. Delgado, supra note 18, at 789. 
75. Id. 
76. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319 (1985); Canadian Human Rights Act, 
R.S.C., ch. H-6, § 13 (1985); Regina v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731; In re Keegstra, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 697, 744-49; WF Party v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN 
GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. 40, at 231, U.N. Doc. No. A/38/40 (1983); see also Kathleen E. 
Mahoney, The Canadian Constitutional Approach to Freedom of Expression in Hate Propa­
ganda and Pornography, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992); Kathleen E. Mahoney, 
Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 
789, 792 n.17, 804-05. 
77. See Delgado, supra note 18, at 785-91. 
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ment: Shiffrin's unrelentingly ideological definition of the dissent­
based free speech project. For Shiffrin, dissent is not about demo­
cratic deliberation, or personal autonomy, or any of several other well­
established theories of free speech. Instead, "dissent" constitutes 
criticism of the existing social structures by select members of disgrun­
tled cultural minorities seeking to slay "hierarchy" and "injustice" in a 
quest to achieve fundamental social change (of a sort consistent with 
progressive/radical ideals of government): 
Dissent attacks existing customs, habits, traditions, institutions, and 
authorities. It spies injustice and brings it to light. This does not mean 
that dissent is always effective; indeed, much dissent does little to bring 
about effective change. Nor is dissent always fair. It may often be dis­
torted by envy of those higher up in a particular hierarchy . . . .  For all its 
occasional faults, dissent is indispensable. Without it, unjust hierarchies 
would surely flourish with little possibility of constructive change. If the 
truth about the presence of injustice is to be spread, social institutions 
must be constructed in a way that nurtures critical speech. [p. 93] 
This conceptualization of dissent, although undoubtedly welcome by 
those who question the importance of speech relative to equality or 
community,78 runs strongly against the grain of prevailing free speech 
norms. 
A. Dissent Comes from Across the Ideological Spectrum 
The problem, obviously enough, is that much contemporary dis­
sent involves what "progressives" may view as implicitly encouraging 
or embracing racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, or homophobic attitudes and 
behaviors; even more dissent explicitly seeks to preserve "existing cus­
toms, habits, traditions, institutions, or authorities" (p. 93) in the face 
of powerful erosive forces. Simply put, there is no reason to suppose 
that dissent, as a social phenomenon, unfailingly redounds to the sup­
port of liberal or radical candidates, policies, or causes. Shiffrin's con­
ceptualization of dissent is, at best, highly romanticized and, at worst, 
hopelessly muve. It is probably true that "we are a long way off from 
a society that is committed to encouraging dissent in an effort to com­
bat injustice" (p. 112). That said, it seems far from clear that more dis­
sent necessarily will advance the cause of social justice. It is just as 
conceivable that reactionary forces might carry the day.79 
78. See Delgado, supra note 18, at 782-95. 
79. Certainly, the recent trend in favor of state initiatives banning or prohibiting volun­
tary affirmative action efforts would suggest that dissent from existing government policies 
does not always redound in favor of positions supported by liberals or progressives. It also 
would be a mistake to assume that state governments support the passage of such anti­
affirmative action initiatives. This was certainly not the case in Washington State, where 
virtually every state-wide elected officer from the Governor on down actively campaigned 
against the passage of Initiative 200. See Sam Howe Verhouek, In a Battle Over Preferences, 
Race and Gender Are at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998, at Al. Thus, supporters of Initia-
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For persons who subscribe to Holmes's marketplace of ideas 
metaphor or to Meiklejohn's conception of free speech80 as a neces­
sary incident of the project of democratic self-government, who wins 
or loses the debate is far less important than the fact of the debate it­
self.81 Shiffrin comes dangerously close to suggesting that freedom of 
speech is the exclusive prerogative of one segment of the community 
- liberals, progressives, and radicals. Given the lack of electoral suc­
cess of such persons in recent times, one might well ask whether a the­
ory of the First Amendment that invites viewpoint or speaker-based 
government censorship will redound to the benefit of Shiffrin's pre­
ferred class of speakers.82 
Of course, Professor Shiffrin does not absolutely condition First 
Amendment protection on speech constituting dissent. Vague refer­
ences to the protection of "political speech" and "commercial speech" 
exist in the text - although the reader is left at sea as to precisely 
what these protections should be (p. xii). Shiffrin's enthusiasm for 
free speech is plainly focused on a particular subset of speech that ad­
vances a specific ideological vision for the community; those who fail 
to advance that agenda, such as tobacco companies or the purveyors 
of alcohol, appear to be left at the gate (pp. 41-42). 
When tobacco companies espouse radically unpopular opinions at 
substantial variance from the existing policies of the government, it is 
difficult to understand why a federal court concerned for dissent 
should withhold the full protection of the First Amendment. After all, 
most theories of dissent are positional: one defines dissent in relation 
to the existing policies and practices of the community. Hence, in a 
state like California with fairly draconian public smoking statutes, a 
tobacco company or restaurant owner seeking the repeal of such laws 
to permit customers to smoke on the restaurant's premises would be 
dissenting from the official policies of the government, policies that 
enjoy the support of a contemporary majority of California voters. 
tive 200 were positioned in opposition to the established political hierarchy in Washington 
State (i.e., they were dissenters). 
80. See supra note 9 and accompanying text 
81. As Justice Holmes explained, "[e]very idea is an incitement," and "[e]loquence may 
set fire to reason." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
Accordingly, the process of democratic deliberation does not guarantee any particular ideo­
logical outcome: "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are des­
tined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." Id. 
82. As Shiffrin himself notes, pp. 121-22, many scholars of the Left have abandoned 
both free speech and rights talk, more generally, as social structures that tend to reify rather 
than challenge existing social, economic, and political conditions. See, e.g., Peter Gabel, The 
Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. 
REV. 1563 (1984); Robert A. Williams Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and 
Promise of Critical Legal Theory for People of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. 103 (1987). 
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Similarly, during the Prohibition years,83 the liquor industry found it­
self in the position of dissenting from the official policies of the federal 
and state governments (an effort that finally bore fruit with the adop­
tion of the Twenty-first Amendment).84 
"The dissent perspective would argue that the policies, prescrip­
tions, and privileges of the elite need to be challenged on a regular ba­
sis by enough people to make a difference" (p. 45). It is difficult to 
fathom precisely what this means, or how a federal district judge 
would go about implementing this mandate. "Elite" positions on 
questions of the day are far from self-evident. Do elites favor or op­
pose abortion on demand? How about school vouchers that may be 
used at pervasively sectarian primary and secondary schools? Should 
federal courts commission polling data or appoint the Gallup Organi­
zation as a special master to determine which viewpoints merit robust 
First Amendment protection and which do not? It is difficult to dis­
agree with Shiffrin that "[p]rotection for dissent is a necessary feature 
of any respectable democracy" (p. 45), but I am not at all sure that any 
respectable democracy could embrace Shiffrin's definition of dissent 
while claiming to maintain more than a mere theoretical commitment 
to the freedom of political speech. 
Professor Shiffrin seems to recognize that problems might inhere 
in implementing his dissent-based vision of the First Amendment. 
Nevertheless, he suggests that courts should accord progressive speech 
regulations broad deference. "[C]ourts should be generous in assess­
ing such regulations because the legislature seeks to advance impor­
tant constitutional goals" (p. 47). If a particular regulation represents 
an imperfect solution to the problem of empowering the marginalized 
voices within the community or silencing the voices of corporations, so 
be it. "Regulations designed to secure justice in the polity need not be 
perfect. Justice should not be delayed because non-viable alternatives 
are conceivable" (p. 47). Shiffrin admonishes that "[a] dissent-based 
approach proceeds from a moral condemnation of unjust hierarchies 
wherever they may be inside or outside of government - whether or 
not they relate to 'public issues' �' (p. 48). 
An unsympathetic reader might ask precisely who will identify the 
"unjust hierarchies" in order to sustain otherwise impermissible view­
point or speaker-based speech regulations. Presumably, this task will 
fall upon some official within the government, perhaps a judge or 
prosecutor. If one accepted Shiffrin's suggestion that the United 
States "is racist to the core" (p. xiii), and dominated by "elite" per­
spectives, it is difficult to understand how his theory of free speech 
could be successfully implemented absent an intervening revolution. 
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XX!. 
May 2000] Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search 1639 
Because persons holding significant positions of power undoubtedly 
would be selected with great care and sophistication by the evil elites 
calling all of the shots, is there really any reason to believe that these 
officials would embrace more than superficially a theory of free 
speech that privileges their mortal enemies while silencing their dear­
est friends? There is, thus, a certain amount of inconsistency in the 
theory between the continued state supervision of speech, the guide­
lines supposedly directing such supervision, and the underlying as­
sumptions about authority's willingness to obey such guidelines - as­
sumptions that created the need for progressive dissent in the first 
place. 
In this regard, consider the case of Missouri Supreme Court Justice 
Ronnie White. The United States Senate refused to give its consent to 
Justice White's appointment to the U.S. federal district court in St. 
Louis, Missouri, allegedly because he was "pro-criminal" and "activ­
ist. "85 The evidence supporting this characterization largely consisted 
of Justice White's voting record in death penalty cases - he had the 
temerity to vote to reverse death sentences in approximately thirty 
percent of the cases that had come before him.86 For this perceived 
failure of judgment, the Senate voted to reject his nomination on a 
straight party line vote of fifty-four Republicans voting against the 
nomination versus forty-five Democrats voting in favor of the nomina­
tion. Justice White's story is but a single part of a larger phenomenon: 
women and racial minorities have greater difficulty obtaining confir­
mation in the contemporary Senate than do heterosexual white men.87 
If a majority of the Senate is prepared to reject a nominee for reg­
istering dissent from his colleagues on ultimate matters of life and 
death, it seems unlikely that the Senators will prove more willing to 
embrace judicial nominees who register political dissent on other con­
troversial issues, such as drug policy. The implications for a dissent­
based theory of free speech should be clear: If Justice Ronnie White 
cannot engage in principled dissent when matters of life and death are 
at stake without rendering himself unfit for federal judicial office, is it 
really plausible to think that the "system" would tolerate officials who 
consistently reach out to protect highly unpopular, marginalized dis­
senters, thereby affording them the broadest protections of the First 
Amendment's free speech guarantee? If contemporary American so-
85. See Charles Babington & Joan Biskupic, Senate Rejects Judicial Nominee, WASH. 
POST, Oct 6, 1999, at Al (describing the circumstances surrounding the Senate's rejection of 
the nomination and quoting Missouri GOP Senator John Ashcroft as describing Justice 
White as "pro-criminal" and "activist"). 
86. See id. 
87. See Ben White, Deepening Rift over Judge Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1999, at A3 
(describing the Senate's higher rejection rate for minority judicial nominees than for nonmi­
nority nominees during the Clinton administration). 
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ciety suffers from as many racial, gender, and class biases as Professor 
Shiffrin suggests and elected officials fairly and accurately implement 
the wishes of their constituents, there is not much cause to be optimis­
tic about these questions. Indeed, Justice White's experience suggests 
that the price of registering dissent can be staggeringly high, even 
when the underlying policy position at issue enjoys broad support 
within a plurality of the community. 
The abject failure of campaign finance reform provides another 
cautionary note for any dissent-based account of free speech. In 
Buckley v. Valeo,88 the Supreme Court accepted the proposition that 
money equals speech and protected unlimited direct spending to elect 
or defeat a particular candidate.89 Moreover, the Buckley Court also 
embraced a financing scheme for presidential elections that effectively 
institutionalizes the Democratic and Republican parties, a system that, 
moreover, hobbles independent and third-party presidential candi­
dates.90 Despite widespread alienation and cynicism about the con­
temporary electoral process, there appears to be little hope for secur­
ing meaningful campaign finance reform anytime soon. Even if the 
Supreme Court were to rethink its "speech equals money" logic, it is 
doubtful that incumbent members of Congress would act against their 
own collective self-interests by enacting meaningful campaign finance 
reform in order to empower political dissenters. In this fashion, then, 
candidates who wish to bring nontraditional programs or platforms be­
fore the American public systematically are disfavored (and thereby 
silenced).91 
Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly would agree with this description of 
the current state of electoral affairs, but probably would argue that the 
proper response is swift adoption of meaningful campaign finance re­
form legislation (pp. 111-12). This begs the fact that we have not ar­
rived in our present situation by mere happenstance. The system 
marginalizes and silences dissent not by accident, but by design.92 Nei­
ther the Democratic nor Republican parties are likely to embrace any 
88. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
89. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 12-23, 39-59; see also Burt Neubome, Toward a 
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1055, 1055-62, 
1071-73 (1999) (critiquing the Buckley decision and offering up rationales for sustaining 
comprehensive campaign finance reform legislation). 
90. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-108; cf. id. at 290, 291-94 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the public funding provisions "enshrined the Re­
publican and Democratic Parties in a permanently preferred position, and has established 
requirements for funding minor-party and independent candidates to which the two major 
parties are not subject"). 
91. See Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2478-82 (1997). 
92. For an extended discussion of the relationship between wealth and free speech, see 
Free Speech and Economic Power: A Symposium, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1053 (1999). 
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program of reform that disserves their short and long term institu­
tional interests.93 
To the extent that dissent presently does not seem to enjoy any 
special call on executive, legislative, or judicial consciences, making all 
speech claims contingent on a subjective label bids fair to legitimate 
greater, not less, suppression of politically marginal speakers. Thus, 
absent some revolutionary change in government (which seems, at 
best, highly unlikely), a system of free speech protection focused pri­
marily on dissent likely would have the perverse effect of further sti­
fling meaningful opposition to existing governmental and economic 
policies and institutions. 
The related problem of ascertaining precisely what constitutes 
"injustice" also exists. Throughout his work, Professor Shiffrin em­
phasizes the importance of dissent to combating successfully "injus­
tice." Describing the proper mission of the public schools, he argues 
that 
our educational system must educate not only autonomous thinkers pre­
pared to reject the habits, customs, and traditions of the larger society 
but also citizens who generally regard dissent against injustice as virtuous 
behavior . . . .  For example, students in large and small groups could be 
assigned projects of challenging injustices they collectively perceive 
within their local communities. [pp. 113-14] 
Such activity should be encouraged because "[t]he practice of chal­
lenging injustice should not only instruct them in the present but also 
encourage them to do so in the future" (p. 114). This is all well and 
good, so long as one leaves undefined the scope and content of "injus­
tice." Once a teacher, principal, administrator, or school board mem­
ber begins attempting to identify "injustices" within the community, 
things are likely to get very complicated very quickly. 
Shiffrin is undoubtedly correct to suggest that injustices exist 
within our society at the national, state, local, and neighborhood level. 
The problem, of course, is that in a diverse and pluralistic society with 
myriad ideological, religious, and social traditions and commitments, 
one person's injustice is another person's tradition.94 It is not at all 
clear that having the government attempt to identify and define "in­
justice" for purposes of applying the First Amendment's Free Speech 
93. See JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE 
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 44-47, 86-105 (1997) (describing public choice theory, the idea 
that legislators, given a free choice, systematically will make decisions that advance their 
own perceived self-interest, with particular attention to the problem of federal campaign fi­
nance reform). 
94. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The War of the Worlds: A Few Comments on Law, 
Culture, and Rights, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 379, 379-83 (1997); Leslye Amede Obiora, 
Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the Campaign Against 
Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 275, 278-79, 332-45, 371-78 (1997). 
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Clause represents a sound jurisprudential approach to vindicating free 
speech claims.95 
B. The Measure of Dissent 
Professor Shiffrin has undertaken an incredibly difficult task: he is 
attempting to square postmodern free speech critiques with a revised 
and renewed liberal free speech tradition. Rather than simply admit­
ting defeat for the liberal conception of free speech and ceding the 
field to the CLS, Critical Race Theory, Feminist Jurisprudence, and 
Law & Sexuality critics, he attempts to construct a multi-cultural and 
postmodern theory of free speech that relocates free speech as a bul­
wark for the protection of oppressed and marginalized cultural minori­
ties. Instead of entrenching the position of existing elites, Shiffrin's 
vision of the First Amendment would make the Free Speech Clause a 
powerful weapon for dispossessed political and cultural minorities to 
challenge what they perceive to be "injustice." 
His definition of dissent demonstrates his commitment to this 
project: it is viewpoint and speaker-:based precisely because a view­
point and speaker-based approach is essential to meeting and refuting 
the critique of the Left. By vesting the strongest protections the Free 
Speech Clause has to offer with the strongest critics of the post­
Brandenburg tradition, he hopes to create a free speech paradigm that 
is acceptable to all. Shiffrin's project is incredibly ambitious, and he 
deserves a great deal of credit for the strength and power of his argu­
ments. One also should note that he self-consciously embraces the 
role of agent provocateur: "I am trying to open a dialogue rather than 
provide the last word" (p. 112). His effort at reconciling the free 
speech tradition with the critique of the New Left is terribly important 
if the social consensus in favor of free speech as a preferred value is to 
be maintained. In other liberal democracies, when these values come 
into conflict, the social commitment to free speech has given way in 
the face of demands that adequately securing values associated with 
equality and community be given a higher priority than protecting free 
speech. 
Professor Shiffrin argues that "there is insufficient reason to sup­
pose that the left acts against its interests in supporting the free speech 
95. For example, the government of South Carolina does not seem to view the contin­
ued display of the Confederate battle flag over the state capitol building "unjust," even 
though many African-American South Carolinians seem to so view the matter. See David 
Firestone, 46,000 March on South Carolina Capitol to Bring Down Confederate Flag, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at A14; Bob Herbert, In America: Of Flags and Slurs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
20, 2000, at Al9. If minorities in South Carolina cannot convince the state government to 
remove an emblem long-associated with racist causes from the seat of state government, 
should they have any confidence that state functionaries would credit their efforts to engage 
in dissent combating other forms of injustice? 
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principle even assuming· that the principle were laissez-faire" (p. 125). 
Free speech facilitates grass-roots organizing and protest, which chal­
lenges the status quo and facilitates reform; accordingly, liberals, pro­
gressives, and radicals should embrace free speech (pp. 124-27). 
Viewed through this prism, the free speech principle "has a strong po­
litical tilt against the unjust exercise of power" (p. 128). Moreover, 
"[l]ike it or not, the free speech principle is here to stay" (p. 129). As 
a matter of political pragmatism, progressives and radicals should ac­
knowledge that "[it] is better political strategy to claim it than to hold 
out oneself as an enemy of a cherished right" (p. 129). Thus, if argu­
ments based on principle do not convince, a frank appeal to practical 
political considerations might get the job done. If neither approach 
succeeds, try to scare the free speech apostates back into the fold with 
the prospect of damnation: a sustained attack on free speech "prom­
ises to guide the left into outer darkness" (p. 130). 
The New Left is badly divided on the value and importance of free 
speech to the progressive cause. A growing number of critics reject 
rights talk in general96 and the value of free speech in particular.97 
Thus, Shiffrin's project represents a sustained and cogent effort to 
bring the free speech schismatics back into· the fold. 
Ultimately, however, even Justice Brennan, the great conciliator, 
would not have been able to reconcile these contending factions. Free 
speech traditionalists are certain to object to Shiffrin's effort to make 
the identity of the speaker - not to mention the content of the 
speaker's message - an important component in determining the 
First Amendment status of speech activity. This aspect of the program 
rends asunder the viewpoint-neutrality project, an essential tenet of 
the traditional First Amendment faith. 
Free speech critics also are unlikely to be convinced.98 Shiffrin has 
attempted to give them a greater stake in the First Amendment by 
vesting disempowered cultural minorities with enhanced claims to free 
speech protection. So long as the instrumentalities of government re­
main in the majoritarian hands, however, the critics will not be satis­
fied. 99 After all, even if cultural minorities enjoyed some greater call 
96. See Gabel, supra note 82; Joel F. Handler, Postmodemism, Protest, and the New So­
cial Movements, 26 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 697, 707 (1992); Robert Williams, supra note 82, at 
114-21. But cf. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Decon­
structed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404-06 (1987); Williams, supra note 82, at 
121-34. 
97. See Delgado, supra note 5, at 140-41; Andrea Dworkin, Pornography ls a Civil 
Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55 (1987/88); Mari Matsuda, Lecture, in 
Alan Borovoy et al., The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Language as Violence vs. 
Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 
BUFF. L. REV. 337, 360 (1988/89). 
98. But see Delgado, supra note 18, at 782-87, 795-98, 802. 
99. See E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator 
From Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. REs. 
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on the Free Speech Clause, the contingency of this claim on courts 
staffed overwhelmingly by members of the majority would breed in­
tense skepticism (with some good cause).100 
C. Enhancing Democratic Deliberation in the Name of Dissent 
It would be a mistake, however, to disregard Shiffrin's call for a 
renewed dialogue about the centrality of dissent to the free speech 
project. Even if one contests his definition of "dissent" and his insis­
tence that "dissent" consistently seeks to overcome "injustice," his 
proposals for facilitating improved public deliberation have great 
merit and deserve serious consideration. 
Shiffrin is surely correct to suppose that the Free Speech Clause 
should facilitate dissent from disaffected individuals and groups within 
the society. Moreover, many of his proposals for enhancing the role 
and visibility of dissent within the body politic are quite sensible. Pro­
fessor Shiffrin suggests four broad reform projects that might improve 
the quality and quantity of public deliberation: 
Any society that encouraged dissent would have to meet four conditions: 
(1) its system of public education would need to promote attitudes and to 
teach skills that would assist in creating a substantial body of citizens 
with the talent and the will to challenge injustice in appropriate circum­
stances; (2) channels of communication for expressing dissent would 
need to be open; (3) legal barriers to dissent would need to be held to a 
minimum; an ( 4) social and governmental institutions would need to be 
designed to make information available to those who wish to dissent. 
[pp. 112-13] 
L. REV. 275, 286-90 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming]; E. Gary Spitko, 
He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII and the "Reasonable Het­
erosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56, 81-89 (1997); E. Gary Spitko, Judge 
Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1065, 1067-69, 1072, 
1075-77 (1999) [hereinafter Spitko, Judge Not]. Professor Spitko's utter distrust of majori­
tarian adjudication of the legal rights of cultural minorities in the public courts has led him to 
call upon cultural minorities to establish their own, quasi-private courts through voluntary 
arbitration. See id. at 1077-83; Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra. Although he has 
never written on First Amendment doctrine, I strongly suspect that he - and others like him 
- would object strongly to any free speech theory that potentially vests judges and juries 
with more, rather than less, discretion because, in his view, such discretion inevitably will 
come to be exercised consistently in a fashion that marginalizes cultural minorities. To the 
extent that data on the question exist, it does seem to support such fears. See Spitko, Gone 
But Not Conforming, supra, at 278-86. 
100. See Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming, supra note 99; Spitko, Judge Not, supra note 
99. As Dean Kathleen M. Sullivan has explained: 
Thus, I believe that a number of the new arguments for speech regulation with a post­
modern twist have a massive non sequitur at their core. Why trust the state - the very 
source of some of the bad, old social structures - to get the new ideology right? There 
might be strong reasons to distrust the state in reordering our ideological preferences, even 
if we trust it to solve other problems in our collective life. 
Sullivan, supra note 63, at 987. 
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Each of these proposals not only would advance a dissent-based vision 
of the Free Speech Clause, but also would advance the project of 
democratic deliberation more generally. In this sense, then, one wed­
ded to a different operational paradigm for the Free Speech Clause 
might still agree with the substance of Professor Shiffrin's program of 
reform. 
It would be difficult to disagree with Professor Shiffrin's assertion 
that the public schools should prepare students for active participation 
in the life of the community. Given the apathy and lack of participa­
tion by young people in contemporary electoral politics,101 it would 
appear that the schools are failing to foster in the nation's youth a 
spirit of civic duty and a corresponding obligation of participation in 
the project of democratic self-government. To be sure, the task of 
preparing young Americans for participation in our democracy does 
not fall solely on the shoulders of teachers and school administrators. 
Nevertheless, the apathy of younger citizens toward the electoral pro­
cess at all levels of government is a problem102 that the schools should 
address. As Professor Shiffrin puts it, "an educational system commit­
ted to producing active citizens with a sense of justice can produce a 
more active citizenry" (p. 113). Undoubtedly, "in educating for de­
mocracy in public and private realms, our schools could do more to 
encourage dissent."103 Were they to do so, perhaps young citizens 
would be less apathetic about actively participating in the project of 
self-governance. 
101. See LINDA J. SAX ET AL., AMERICAN FREsHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS FOR FALL 
1997, at 2-4 (1997); Charles N. Quigley, Civic Education: Recent History, Current Status, and 
the Future, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1425, 1433-35 (1999); see also Richard Harrington, Giving a Rap 
About Voting, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1992, at Fl ("Since 1971, young people's voting partici­
pation has declined with each presidential election {36 percent in 1988)."); Rene Sanchez, 
College Freshmen Have the Blahs, Survey Indicates; Academic, Civic Apathy Reach Record 
Levels, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1998, at Al (reporting on minimal interest of entering college 
freshmen in civic participation, with "[o]nly about 17%" expressing interest in " 'influencing 
the political structure' " and a mere 21 % indicating that they regularly vote in student elec­
tions); Rene Sanchez & Audrey Gillan, Outnumbered, Outvoted, Out of Clout on the Hill, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at Al ("Some analysts say the percentage of young adults who 
vote in presidential elections, which has never been high but showed new signs of growth in 
1992, tumbled below 30% last year."). 
102. See Panel Discussion: Civic Education, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1451, 1459, 1462 {1999) 
(reporting that only 20% of young adults voted in the last federal election and warning that 
"[t]he participation of young people in voting and other forms of civic association appears to 
be in a free-fall. We can expect the lowest voting turnout yet among 18-to-25-year-olds in 
the next presidential election."); Steven A. Holmes, The Melting Pot Politics of 2000 Are 
Truly Soupy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2000, § 4, at 1 ("Despite efforts like MTV's 'Rock the 
Vote,' young people continue to be among the most politically apathetic groups in the coun­
try."). 
103. P. 114. Ironically, students currently enjoy very limited free speech rights on cam­
pus and, therefore, their opportunity to engage in dissent is more apparent than real. See S. 
Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs - Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer 
of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 120-21 (1995) (noting that "core political 
speech is no more protected in the public schools than a dirty limerick scrawled in a bath­
room stall"). 
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Professor Shiffrin's second reform proposal deals with access to 
the media (pp. 115-17). He criticizes broadcasters for caring too much 
about maximizing profits and too little about facilitating democratic 
deliberation (including, of course, dissent) (pp. 115-17). His sugges­
tions for improving the mass media's contribution to public discourse 
include increasing candidate access to the media, creating opportuni­
ties for the public to access media outlets to communicate their ideas 
with the larger community, and a renewed commitment to non­
commercial broadcasting (pp. 116-17). All of these proposals would 
materially improve the process of democratic deliberation in this 
country and should receive serious consideration.104 
Professor Shiffrin's failure to address the Internet as a potential 
platform for dissent is puzzling. Although television broadcasters and 
cable system operators presently deliver programming to mass audi­
ences on a more reliable basis than the Internet, technological changes 
will chip away at the existing broadcast media's monopoly on mass 
audiences. Accordingly, the need to ensure accountability from 
broadcasters and cable system operators may .be reduced as the Inter­
net makes programming, content-on-demand a reality.105 This is not to 
say that established media cannot or should not do a better job of fa­
cilitating democratic deliberation. Rather, their continuing failure to 
take action may be less important over the long term than Shiffrin 
suggests. 
Professor Shiffrin also proposes reforms aimed at reducing the op­
portunity costs (pp. 117-18) and transaction costs (pp. 118-20) associ­
ated with engaging in dissent. Again, even if one were to dispute or 
reject Professor Shiffrin's definition of "dissent" as unduly limited, his 
proposals for reducing the potential liabilities associated with speech 
activity on matters of public concern would enhance the ability of av­
erage citizens to participate in the project of democratic deliberation. 
In other words, limiting the liability associated with engaging in public 
debate and enhancing the access of average citizens to the means of 
participating in public debate would be wise policies under any plausi-
104. Having previously endorsed many of the same proposals, I hardly can be heard to 
object to Shiffrin's call for a renewed commitment by the mf1SS media to facilitating the proj­
ect of participatory democracy. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Into the Woods: Broadcast­
ers, Bureaucrats, and Children's Television Programming, 45 DUKE LJ. 1193, 1236-48 (1996); 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public Trustee Model of 
Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2134-38 {1997) (book 
review) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland]. 
105. There might still be a need for government-subsidized educational programming in 
the age of the Internet. Although the Internet will provide a platform for delivering pro­
gramming content to a mass audience, one must still hire writers, producers, and actors to 
create the content. The history of public access cable stations suggests that providing a plat­
form for the delivery of programming content will not ensure a reliable supply of high qual­
ity programming. See Krotoszynski, The Inevitable Wasteland, supra note 104, at 2128-29. 
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ble conception of free speech in a democratic society.106 As with the 
proposals associated with broadcasting, one wonders why Professor 
Shiffrin does not explore the possibilities of the Internet for facilitat­
ing democratic deliberation and dissent. Although broadcast media 
remain critically important to the process of elections and public de­
bate, new media are going to play an increasingly important role in 
democratic deliberation. A reform program aimed at securing regula­
tions that promote the dissent-enhancing possibilities of the Internet, a 
relatively new medium for mass communication, might possess greater 
potential for success.107 
Professor Shiffrin is right to challenge the legal community to think 
creatively about ways in which to secure greater and more representa­
tive public participation in the project of democratic deliberation. In 
the end, Professor Shiffrin undoubtedly is correct to assert that with 
respect to encouraging public participation in self-government: "[w]e 
can do better. We cannot do enough" (p. 120). 
III. DISSENT IN THE SERVICE OF THE LORD: RELIGIOUSLY 
MOTIVATED DISSENT AND THE-SECULAR STATE 
Professor Stephen Carter, like Professor Shiffrin, presents a 
dissent-based model for conceptualizing the freedom of speech. And, 
like Shiffrin, Carter has a particular set of speakers in mind when ar­
guing that dissent should play a greater role in contemporary political 
debate. "Mainstream politics, with its arrogant rejection of religious 
argument and traditional religious values, has alienated tens of mil­
lions of voters, and by no means are all of them hard-line conserva­
tives" (p. 9). Carter's thesis is an elaborate argument in favor of tak­
ing religiously motivated dissent more seriously. 
Invoking traditional Enlightenment conceptions of the state, 
Carter argues that a government retains its legitimate claim to the al­
legiance of its people only so long as it remains responsive to their 
needs, wants, and desires (pp. 7-19). Traditionally, these ideas are ex­
pressed in the maxim that just governments derive their legitimacy 
from the consent of the governed, a consent that is ongoing and freely 
given.108 Professor Carter suggests modifying the maxim by placing 
greater emphasis on the government's responsiveness to the dissent of 
the governed (pp. 4-7). Invoking language in the Declaration of Inde-
106. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defaml]tion & Discourse in Cyber­
space, 49 DUKE LJ. 855, 860-65, 876-83 (2000). 
107. See id. at 892-904, 944-46. 
108. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES ON 
GOVERNMENT 'll'll 89-94, 95-99, 123-31, 134-42, 211-43 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690); JEAN 
JACQUES ROSSEAU, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER 
PoLmCAL WRmNGS 48-54 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans. 1997) (1762). 
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pendence complaining that "[o]ur repeated Petitions have been an­
swered only by repeated Injury,"109 Carter argues that legitimacy 
should be as much a function of how a government responds to dissent 
as it is about creating and sustaining programs that enjoy broad ma­
joritarian support: 
Perhaps governments - good and fair ones anyway - do not after all 
derive their powers from the consent of the governed. Perhaps they de­
rive their powers instead from the dissent of the governed. For the fair­
ness and decency of any state should be assessed not alone through a 
study of whether its majorities examine it and find it good, but through a 
study of whether its minorities examine it and find it good. Another way 
to look at the matter is this: the justice of a state is not measured merely 
by its authority's tolerance for dissent, but also by its dissenters' toler­
ance for authority. [p. 97] 
Carter, like Shiffrin, sees dissent as essential to the construction of 
a just polity. "Civic life requires dissent because it requires differences 
of opinion in order to spark the dialogues from which the community 
thrives and grows."110 Yet, "[i]n contemporary America . . .  the nation 
is all too full of people and groups who insist that the political sover­
eign does not hear their voices" (p. 18). If something is not done to 
correct this state of affairs, Carter warns that "disaffection may tum to 
disallegiance" (p. 18). 
A. Community, Power, and the Importance of Dissent 
Majorities naturally attempt to inculcate a common set of values as 
part of an ongoing effort to maintain community identity. Sometimes 
these efforts are benign, and sometimes they are not. Carter provides 
a historical sketch of the use of the public schools as a tool in forging a 
single, Protestant concept of American citizenship (pp. 19-45). In 
many respects, this effort was less about ensuring universal education 
and civic participation than about destroying pre-existing ties to Old 
World institutions, such as the Roman Catholic Church. 
One study of textbooks concluded that the aim of the public schools by 
the turn of the century was to replace the love of what was viewed as a 
foreign God with a love of America as a country - very much the Know­
Nothing program, long after the party itself vanished from the scene. 
[pp. 44-45; footnote omitted] 
Carter believes that a project of using the public schools to inculcate 
Protestant values has now evolved into a project of teaching purely 
secular values, including open disrespect for religion and religious in­
stitutions (pp. 44-49). He warns that the government sows the "seeds 
of disallegiance" when "our 'free' society counts among the powers of 
109. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776). 
110. P. 16; see also Emerson, supra note 14, at 883-84. 
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government the power to use education as the lever to eradicate un­
wanted religious traditions" (p. 47). 
Unlike Shiffrin, Carter's vision of dissent is completely viewpoint­
and speaker-neutral. "It is very much in the nature of the tools of 
democratic dissent that they may be used by the bad guys as well as 
the good guys" (p. 120). Carter recognizes and embraces the idea that 
robust protection of dissent undoubtedly will mean that some parents 
inculcate immoral and unjust ideas in their children. "The freedom of 
the family to make religious choices - a freedom that is essential if 
religious communities are to be able to survive by projecting their nar­
ratives over time - must include the freedom to make choices other 
than the best" (p. 48). Freedom necessarily encompasses "the privi­
lege of making mistakes" (p. 48). If the state attempts to replace pa­
rental values with the government's values, parents will respond first 
with dissent and, if this proves unavailing, with disallegiance. 
Professor Carter pursues this idea to its logical conclusion: a right 
of revolution in the face of an unresponsive government (pp. 53-99). 
In his view, we increasingly run the risk of forcing loyal, but dissenting, 
citizens to consider this alternative because of the community's refusal 
to take seriously their objections to a number of current social policies 
(most notably including legalized abortion). Pointing to the Supreme 
Court's contemporary free exercise jurisprudence as a case in point, 
Carter suggests that the government's effective message to religious 
minorities is "it doesn't matter if the secular sovereign makes it diffi­
cult for you to practice your religion, because there are lots of other 
religions out there, and you can choose one of the others instead" (p. 
57). Returning to his theme of dissent, Carter posits that although 
"[i]t is, of course, vital to the notion of witness that the witnesses can 
be seen and heard" the secular authorities nevertheless have sanc­
tioned the "remov[ al] of pro-life protesters from defined zones in 
front of clinics where abortions are performed" (p. 60). 
Properly understood and implemented, a meaningful commitment 
to free speech values, at one time or another, will prove vexing to all 
constituencies within the community. "This is perhaps the principal 
glory of our First Amendment tradition: properly understood, it frus­
trates everybody - or at least everybody possessing the will to censor 
debate and the political power with which to do it" (p. 65). The prob­
lem, as Carter sees it, is that religiously motivated dissent is no longer 
taken seriously by either the government or the secular cultural ma­
jority. This then forces religiously motivated dissenters to consider re­
sorting to political crimes in order to bring their concerns to the atten­
tion of the community and provoke some kind of response (pp. 67-78). 
Thus, if a government meets repeated petitions with "repeated 
Injuries," the government loses its right to command the allegiance of 
the dissenters (pp. 9-13). At the same time, problems arise because 
governments and dominant community groups often equate dissent 
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with disallegiance or disloyalty (pp. 16-19). The problem is exacer­
bated when religious communities attempt to establish themselves as 
separate communities within the larger whole (pp. 67-86). Carter ac­
knowledges that some self-constituted groups engage in grossly anti­
social behaviors, like murdering physicians who perform abortions or 
bombing federal buildings. Nevertheless, "[ o ]ne must not make the 
mistake of assuming that the violence and perhaps paranoia of these 
groups is an argument against the ideal of self-constituted communi­
ties; it is simply evidence, were any needed, that there is wickedness 
everywhere" (p. 83). 
B. Reaffirming the National Commitment to Dissent 
Significantly, Carter's arguments are aimed far less at fringe groups 
than traditional liberals, whose commitment to free speech principles 
has been wavering of late.111 "[I]f we are to preach more tolerance, it 
is not sufficient to preach it to intolerant, divisive religionists, of which 
there are many; we must preach it as well to intolerant, divisive secular 
liberals, many of whom seem to value diversity across every spectrum 
except the religious" (p. 85). He further posits that the success of the 
liberal agenda has created ambivalence about the use of state power to 
squelch dissent. "This is a greater problem for liberalism in the 1990s 
than it was in the 1960s because liberalism has won so many political 
battles in the intervening decades that it has developed a troubling 
moral complacency, particularly with respect to the tough questioning 
of authority that was once its glory" (pp. 85-86). This "complacency" 
has led to free speech backsliding: 
It is indeed a bit embarrassing, given the 1960s, but when today's liberals 
talk about, say, protests at abortion clinics, one can hear, echoing down 
time's corridors, the terrifying logic of the silencing slogan of the silent 
majority days: "America - Love it or Leave It!" Which means, of 
course, "Our America - do it our way or go to jail!" [p. 86] 
How then, should free speech theory attempt to address the phe­
nomenon of religiously motivated dissent? Professor Carter argues 
for a "dialogue" based model in which dissent is not ignored or deval-
111. To the extent Professor Carter's intended audience encompasses leftists and radi­
cals, his proposals are likely to receive a decidedly frostier reception than Professor 
Shriffrin's dissent thesis. This is because Professor Carter's paradigmatic dissenters - re­
ligiously motivated opponents of abortion rights - are a group potentially silenced (or at 
least muzzled) under Professor Shriffin's dissent theory of free speech. Although one should 
not overgeneralize, most leftists and radicals within the legal academy support efforts to re­
duce gender subordination and enhance feminist agency, and therefore, would view 
women's potential loss of control over reproduction as a serious setback to the cause. In this 
way, Professor Carter's model of dissenters illustrates a potential objection to Professor 
Shiffrin's theory, at least if one believes (as most liberals do) that the viewpoint of a speaker 
generally should not prefigure whether particular speech activity merits or enjoys constitu­
tional protection. 
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ued merely because the speaker happens to possess religious motiva­
tions, or uses overtly religious arguments, for advancing her position. 
Such an approach would "mean that there is nothing about the relig­
ious source of their convictions that should bar them from public dia­
logue - a terrible rule, and one which, as I have mentioned, would 
have destroyed or severely disabled the moral arguments of both the 
Abolitionist movement and the civil rights movement" (p. 93). 
Professor Carter lodges his complaint not so much against Con­
gress and the Executive Branch of the federal government, but rather 
against the federal judiciary, which, in his view, has been insufficiently 
protective of religiously motivated dissenters within the community. 
He believes the federal courts are overconfident of their analytical ca­
pabilities; the project of judicial review (or judicial supremacy) "rests 
on the foundational point that the courts are far wiser than anybody 
else (sovereign or citizens) and thus must be obeyed, always and eve­
rywhere and by everyone. Period" (p. 110). 
In a move reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln's scathing critique of 
the then-recent Dred Scott112 decision during the Lincoln-Douglas de­
bates,113 Professor Carter questions whether judicial decisions should 
be obeyed if they reject or betray the fundamental moral commit­
ments of the community. "[I]t is not obvious· that people will obey ju­
dicial opinions that are wrongheaded, and even less obvious that they 
should" (p. 114). Contemporary liberal reverence for the courts, sug­
gests Carter, is a lingering shadow of the civil rights movement. 
But that history is of use oruy if we suppose it' to prove that judges will 
usually be wiser than politicians. At times they are - but over the long 
run, the human beings who judge are every bit as capable of error and 
wickedness as the human beings who legislate or carry the laws into exe­
cution. [p. 131] 
Professor Carter is undoubtedly correct. The same Supreme Court 
that gave us Brown v. Board of Education114 also gave us Dred Scott v. 
Sandford115 and Plessy v. Ferguson116 (not to mention Korematsu117 and 
Bowers v. Hardwick118). Simply put, there is no reason to believe that 
112. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
113. See The First Joint Debate at Ottawa (Aug. 21, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES 40, 74-77 (Harold Holzer ed., 1993); The Third Joint Debate at Jonesboro (Sept. 
15, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra, at 136, 168-72; The Fifth Joint De­
bate at Gatesburg (Oct. 7, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra, at 234, 262-
64; The Seventh Joint Debate at Alton (Oct. 15, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS 
DEBATES, supra, at 321, 360-62. 
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
115. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
116. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
117. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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the courts alone possess the ability to engage in virtuous or just poli­
cymaking, or that they will do so on a consistent basis.119 Of course, 
judges, unlike members of Congress or the President, do not face 
regular democratic accountability (i.e., the need to seek and obtain re­
election to office). Institutionally, at least, they are better positioned 
to interpose themselves between the wishes of the majority and the 
rights of an unpopular minority.120 Although Professor Carter rightly 
questions whether the federal judiciary's decisions routinely promote 
justice, in some respects he fails to credit the judiciary for its moral 
victories. 
For example, Professor Carter makes much of the fact that the 
Supreme Court upheld "breach of the peace" convictions against 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and other members of the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference for marching in Birmingham, Alabama on 
Easter Sunday without a permit.121 He does not mention that the piv­
otal moment of the civil rights movement - the Selma-to­
Montgomery March - took place under the protection of a federal 
court order issued by district judge Frank M. Johnson, J r.122 Given the 
scope, scale, and duration of this mass protest activity, it is rather diffi­
cult to imagine how it could have taken place without the formal sanc­
tion of law. 
The Selma March ignited the conscience of the national commu­
nity and led to the passage of the landmark Voting Rights Act of 
1965.123 More than any other mass-protest action, it changed the face 
of the nation. Federal judicial intervention sustained the march 
against the entrenched opposition of every element of the state gov­
ernment.124 Professor Carter's unqualified slashing attacks on the fed­
eral judiciary give insufficient credit to the personal and professional 
sacrifices of judges like Frank M. Johnson, Jr., J. Skelly Wright, Elbert 
P. Tuttle, John R. Brown, John Minor Wisdom, and Richard T. 
Rives.125 
119. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and 
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 49-60 (1998); cf. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNA­
TIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13, 123-50, 
232-70 (1994). 
120. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLmCS (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
121. Pp. 105-10. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
122. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965); see also Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 
104 YALE LJ. 1411 (1995). 
123. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 
(1994)); Krotoszynski, supra note 122, at 1412, 1427-28. 
124. See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 105-09. 
125. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981). 
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Professor Carter's attack on the judiciary is really in the service of 
a subsidiary point, however. Given that the judiciary is not infallible, 
it is entirely reasonable to suppose that citizens might profoundly dis­
agree with a particular decision of the federal courts. In his view, Roe 
v. Wade126 presents a good example of this phenomenon. Carter ar­
gues that Roe rests not on constitutional principle, but rather on the 
"moral instincts" of the Justices composing the Supreme Court's ma­
jority in favor of the result (p. 136). Given this state of affairs, he asks: 
"Would it be so unreasonable for an aroused citizen - or an aroused 
majority of citizens - to wonder why the judges' moral instincts are a 
better extra-constitutional source than the moral instincts of the peo­
ple themselves?" (p. 136). His answer: "Clearly not; nor can the 
judges themselves provide a persuasive response, unless the response 
indicates a willingness to engage in that conversation - not mono­
logue - of which Bickel wrote. "127 
Only by taking seriously the dissent of cultural, racial, or religious 
minorities can the nation lay a valid claim to respecting democratic 
pluralism. "In all of this, my concern has been for the autonomy of 
the many communities - particularly, but not exclusively, religious 
communities - into which democratic citizens organize themselves" 
(p. 142). Respect for democratic pluralism means respecting opinions 
that may seem wrongheaded, or even evil: "That the mores of some 
communities may seem to be morally objectionable or simply bizarre 
only fortifies the point, for it is only through the willingness to accept 
these differences that we become truly democratic" (p. 142). Rather 
than using law to disperse and destroy these self-constituted communi­
ties, government "should more properly serve as a means to preserve 
the diversity among our communities of meaning" (p. 142). 
C. Making the Case for According Religiously Motivated Dissent 
Greater Solicitude: Mixed Motives and the Need to Recognize the 
Difference Between Jihad and Community Survival 
One would be hard-pressed to disagree with Professor Carter's 
plea that we take the opinions of religiously motivated dissenters seri­
ously. Undoubtedly, such speakers often fail to secure a meaningful 
hearing because many object to the idea of imposing public policies on 
the general community based on a particular set of religious commit­
ments. Indeed, when John Kennedy ran for president in 1960, many 
commentators worried about whether Kennedy would make inde-
126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
127. P. 136. See BICKEL, supra note 120, at 26, 65-72, 117, 127-33, 205-06, 235-43, 261; 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 110-11 (1975); see also Barry 
Friendman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 586-90, 653-80 (1993); 
Krotoszynski, supra note 119, at 46. 
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pendent policy determinations free and clear of Vatican influence.128 
More recently, New York governor Mario Cuomo wrestled with the 
problem of squaring his official duties with his Catholic faith, particu­
larly with regard to the abortion issue.129 
At the same time, there is something disturbing about a particular 
religious sect's attempting to use the levers of secular power to achieve 
sectarian aims. For example, the recent controversy in Kansas over 
the teaching of evolution strongly suggests that religious dissenters do 
not merely want a hearing, they want to win the debate and implement 
their policy views on the entire political community.130 The Kansas 
state school board's decision to remove evolution from the state­
mandated science curriculum was not an isolated event - across the 
nation, religious fundamentalists are working daily to take over local 
and state school boards, often with tremendous success.131 
128. See LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND .AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 172 
{1967); 'THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MA.KING OF TIIE PRESIDENT, 1960, at 259-62 (1961); 
John F. Kennedy, Jr., Remarks on Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1960, § 1, at 22, 
reprinted in CHlJRCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 190 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. 
Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987); see also Paul J. Weithman, John Courtney Murray - Do His 
Ideas Still Matter?, AMERICA, Oct. 29, 1994, at 17; Catholicism and the Campaign, 72 
COMMONWEAL 507-08 {1960). In an earlier presidential campaign, the election of 1928, 
New York Governor Al Smith, the Democratic nominee, came under sharp attack because 
of his membership in the Roman Catholic Church and, like John F. Kennedy, found himself 
forced to defend his religious associations. See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., O'Connor, Vaughan, 
Cuomo, Al Smith, J.F.K., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at A31. 
129. See Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's 
Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 13 {1984); see also Ari L. Goldman, 
New York's Controversial Archbishop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 38; Sam 
Roberts, Cuomo to Challenge Archbishop over Criticism of Abortion Stand, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 1984, at Al. Catholic scholars have noted the potential difficulties of remaining 
faithful to the teachings of the Church while discharging a civil function. See, e.g., John H. 
Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998); 
John H. Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849 {1993). 
130. See Pam Belluck, Board for Kansas Deletes Evolution from Curriculum, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999, at Al; Jacques Steinberg, Evolution Struggle Shifts to Kansas School 
Districts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999, at Al. The Kansas School Board came under sharp 
criticism for its decision. Noted Harvard paleontologist, Stephen Jay Gould, described the 
decision as "like saying '[w]e're going to continue to teach English, but you don't have to 
teach grammar,' " and predicted that the citizens of Kansas "would be profoundly embar· 
rassed by the stupidity of the ruling" and "would vote that school board out of office the 
next year." Claudia Dreifus, Primordial Beasts, Creationists, and Mighty Yankees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1999, at F3. 
131. Hanna Rosin, Creationism Evolves, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1999, at Al ("In the last 
four years, school boards in at least seven states -Arizona, Alabama, Illinois, New Mexico, 
Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska - have tried to remove evolution from state science standards 
or water down the concepts, with varying degrees of success."); see also Sandra Blakeslee, In 
Schools Across the Land, a Group Mounts Counterattacks on "Creation Science," N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, § 1, at 20; Hanna Rosin, Creationism, Coming to Life in Suburbia, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1999, at Al. Dr. Stephen Jay Gould blames this state of affairs on apa­
thy toward school board elections: 
The only reason it [the Kansas decision to remove evolution from the state's science cur­
riculum] happened is that nobody votes in school board elections anymore. Thus, deter­
mined minorities can take over. It took this fundamentalist group three election cycles to 
May 2000] Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search 1655 
There is something inherently destructive of political community 
when one group of citizens attempts to impose theologically grounded 
public policies on citizens who do not share the same set of theological 
commitments.132 It is one thing to say that feeding the hungry makes 
for good public policy; it is another to say that, because Jesus com­
mands the feeding of the hungry, those who oppose the policy will 
surely burn in hell.133 "Competition among religions for position 
within government must be avoided so that none need fear any other, 
as each might otherwise seek its own establishment through govern­
ment or within govemment."134 
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger elaborated on these concerns in his 
landmark opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman.135 He argued that 
"[o]rdinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even 
take over in Kansas. They only have a one-vote majority, 6-4. Four are up for election next 
year. 
Dreifus, supra note 130. 
132. See Cuomo, supra note 129, at 16-20. As Governor Cuomo puts the matter: 
I protect my right to be a Catholic by preserving your right to believe as a Jew, a Protestant 
or non-believer, or as anything else you choose. We know that the price of seeking to force 
our beliefs on others is that they might some day force theirs on us. This freedom is the fun­
damental strength of our unique experiment in government. In the complex interplay of 
forces and considerations that go into the making of our laws and policies, its preservation 
must be a pervasive and dominant concern. 
Id. at 16; see also James Madison, The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As­
sessments, June 20, 1785, reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 301-02 
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (warning against the infusion of sectarian argumenta­
tion in public policy debates "[b]ecause it will have a • . .  tendency to banish our Citizens" 
(i.e., utterly alienate them from the project of democratic discourse on the basis of relig­
ion.)). But cf. Ronald Reagan, Politics and Morality Are Inseparable, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7 (1984) (arguing in favor of active efforts by people of faith to seek 
legislative reforms incorporating their faith-based policy preferences). 
133. See Cuomo, supra note 129, at 19-20. As Justice J,ackson stated the matter: 
This freedom [freedom from "establishments" of religion] was first in the Bill of Rights be­
cause it was first in the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength 
is its rigidity. It was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep 
religion's hands off the state, and above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public 
life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy or 
the public purse. 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson 
plainly believed that overt efforts to inject questions of faith into public policy debates might 
bring about highly divisive church/state relationships that would undermine confidence in 
the civil state and risk the autonomy of communities of faith. Of course, Professor Carter is 
not arguing for the creation of John Calvin's Geneva, but he is arguing that those who advo­
cate such arrangements receive a full and fair hearing from the general community. At least 
arguably, encouraging overt efforts to give greater weight to those who generally reject a 
strict separation of church doctrine and matters of state risks the advent of irreconcilable 
divisions within the community. One need look no further than modern day Northern Ire­
land to see the potential negative effects of overtly evangelized politics. 
134. William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling 
Wall -A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 777-78. 
135. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic sys­
tem of government, but political division along religious lines was one 
of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended 
to protect."136 In Burger's view, "[t]he potential divisiveness of such 
conflict is a threat to the normal political process."137 This does not 
mean, of course, that religiously motivated dissent should not enjoy 
First Amendment protection. Rather, it suggests that, in a pluralistic 
community, constituted by individuals possessing myriad racial, cul­
tural, and religious identities, overt efforts to impose public policies 
based on faith-based understandings of appropriate human behavior 
might not represent the best course of action for the community. In 
public policy terms, efforts to inject facially theological arguments into 
policy debates (i.e., "God commands that abortion be treated as mur­
der") run a serious risk of ending, rather than facilitating, the conver­
sation. Moreover, it is far from clear that a law passed solely in order 
to satisfy religious scruples (or primarily for that purpose) would pass 
muster under Establishment Clause analysis.138 
Professor Carter makes strong arguments for the benefits of relig­
iously motivated dissent, and posits some rather nasty consequences of 
completely ignoring such speakers, but he never really attempts to 
present or consider the other side of the question. Is self-consciously 
religiously motivated public policy sustainable in a pluralistic democ­
racy? This is a question that Carter never asks, much less answers. 
Consider, for example, anti-abortion protestors. Professor Carter 
consistently uses anti-abortion protestors as his paradigm of ignored, 
slighted, and legally marginalized religiously motivated dissenters. He 
argues strongly that the general community must engage such dissent­
ers on the merits of their position in an ongoing "dialogue" about 
community values (pp. 20, 60-61, 74-81, 90-95, 134-36). The problem, 
of course, is that the most committed anti-abortion protestors view 
abortion as murder - no different than randomly shooting a passerby 
on the street. Carter seems to be aware of this faction of the pro-life 
movement: 
After all, if a pro-life protester is persuaded by his religious understand­
ing that fetuses are human, that abortion is murder, and that physicians 
136. Id. at 622; see also Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. 
REV. 1680, 1692 (1969) ("While political debate and division is normally a wholesome proc· 
ess for reaching viable acco=odations, political division on religious lines is one of the 
principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall."). 
137. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. 
138. See id. at 612-13 (holding that a "statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or printary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig· 
ion, finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with relig­
ion' " (citations omitted)). A Jaw passed in order to satisfy the religious convictions of a par­
ticular religious sect arguably lacks a secular purpose and, moreover, directly advances a 
particular religion's social objectives. 
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who perform abortions are thus, literally, baby-killers, why (other than 
moral cowardice, a fear to face the judgment of the society) should he 
not kill the doctors? [p. 74] 
The question that begs to be asked is: How can one sustain a mean­
ingful dialogue with such a person? Although Carter faults secular 
liberals for dismissing, out-of-hand, the viewpoints of religious dis­
senters, he fails to acknowledge the unwillingness of many religious 
dissenters to compromise. Compromise, of course, is the mortar of 
democratic self-government. 
Thus, a careful reader might lodge a rather basic objection to Pro­
fessor Carter's theory of free speech: he seeks a dialogue with persons 
unwilling to compromise what they believe to be divinely ordered 
resolutions to hotly contested questions of public policy. A person 
who believes that God has commanded a particular result is unlikely 
to strike a deal that involves anything short of total victory. 
As the existential philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, explained so 
eloquently, faith ceases to be faith when one has reasons for holding a 
particular belief.139 In Kierkegaard's view, real faith requires the cruci­
fixion of reason and the embrace of the "absurd" - strongly held, en­
tirely intuitive convictions that one simply cannot justify through ra­
tional explication.140 Thus, the very idea of rational dialogue about 
matters of faith confronts a difficulty: faith does not subsist on reason, 
139. See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the "Philosophi­
cal Fragments": An Existential Contribution by Johannes Climacus, reprinted in A 
KIERKEGAARD ANTHOLOGY 190, 214-216 {Robert Bretall ed., 1946) {1843) [hereinafter 
Kierkegaard, Postscript]; SOREN KIERKEGAARD, Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric, 
reprinted in A KIERKEGAARD ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 116, 130-34 [hereinafter Kierkegaard, 
Fear and Trembling]. As Kierkegaard puts the matter: 
Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite pas­
sion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am capable of grasping 
God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe. If I 
wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast to objective un­
certainty, so that in the objective uncertainty I am out "upon the seven fathoms of water" 
and yet believe. 
KIERKEGAARD, Postscript, supra, at 215. 
140. See KIERKEGAARD, Postscript, supra note 139, at 255 {"Faith is the objective un­
certainty along with the repulsion of the absurd held fast in the passion of inwardness, which 
precisely is inwardness potentiated to the highest degree."). In this regard, it bears noting 
that Abraham serves as Kierkegaard's archetype of faith because Abraham was prepared to 
violate all universalist ethical prescriptions by murdering his son, Isaac. See KIERKEGAARD, 
Fear and Trembling, supra note 139, at 130-34. Abraham possessed such faith that he was 
willing to murder his own son because he believed that God required him to do so. See id. 
Of course, one longs to ask the question: "What if Abraham was wrong about God's will?" 
As Kierkegaard aptly notes, "[t]herefore, although Abraham arouses my admiration, he at 
the same time appalls me." Id. at 133. Abraham's story represents an individual transcend­
ing traditional notions of morality because faith requires him to do so. "The story of 
Abraham contains therefore a teleological suspension of the ethical." Id. at 134. Abraham 
transcends the universal - "[i]f such is not the position of Abraham, then he is not even a 
tragic hero but a murderer." Id. Accordingly, "[f]aith is a miracle, and yet man is not ex­
cluded from it; for that in which all human life is unified is passion, and faith is a passion." 
Id. 
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but belief. There is little cause to suppose that a dialogue challenging 
someone's most fundamental teleological commitments will prove 
fruitful: "to him who follows the narrow way of faith, no one can give 
counsel, him no one can understand. "141 
In light of the bitter disagreements associated with knowing 
"God's will,'' the history of theocratic states has not been particularly 
happy, and the admixture of religion and politics has led to a great 
deal of bloodshed throughout human history.142 As Professor William 
Van Alstyne has explained, "The idea of a civil nation of free people, 
diverse in their thoughts, equal in their citizenship, and with none to 
feel alien, outcast, or stranger in relation to civil authority, remains 
powerful and compelling."143 The problem boils down to this: How 
does one maintain a meaningful dialogue with a person who, by divine 
ordinance, cannot compromise her demands of the secular state? Pro­
fessor Carter does not offer much help on this aspect of the problem. 
Moreover, given that the secular state permits citizens to organize 
into separate "communities within the community,'' the state's toler­
ance for a particular behavior does not effectively mean that all citi­
zens must engage in the behavior. If a particular religious community 
rejects homosexual sodomy as an abomination in the sight of God, it is 
quite free to maintain that belief and its members are free to conduct 
their sexual lives in accordance with it. The group's members may 
teach this value to their children and remove them from the public 
schools in order to ensure that secular authorities do not inculcate 
contrary values.144 Beyond this, however, I am not sure what claim of 
right the self-constituted religious community should have over the 
rest of the community. 
That is to say, if a majority of citizens embrace sexual autonomy as 
an official state policy, I do not think that a religious dissenter has a 
right to demand the reenactment of the proscription against sodomy. 
I do not disagree with Carter that a person seeking such a legislative 
change ought to be permitted to speak in favor of a return to tradi­
tional morals,145 but a failure on the part of the community to act on 
that suggestion, or even to afford the religiously motivated dissenter a 
polite audience, would not justify acts of terrorism against the state by 
the religious dissenter. 
141. KIERKEGAARD, Fear and Trembling, supra note 139, at 134. 
142. The Thirty Years' War is one example; the present dysfunctions in Northern 
Ireland provide yet another. When religionists attempt to use the secular state as a tool of 
indoctrination {whether voluntary or not), those who are not co-religionists are likely to re­
spond negatively (not to put too fine a point on the matter). 
143. Van Alstyne, supra note 134, at 787. 
144. The Constitution certainly would privilege such a decision. See Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
145. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 308-10 (1940). 
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Thus, if the community affords greater opportunities for religious 
dissent, but nevertheless rejects the positions advanced by the relig­
ious dissenters, I am not at all convinced that the religious dissenters 
will let the matter go. To put the matter in Carter's nomenclature, af­
ter the "repeated petitions" of the anti-sodomy religious dissenters fail 
to achieve meaningful social and legal reforms, are they then free to 
proclaim their "disallegiance" from the community and take up armed 
resistance?146 Portions of Professor Carter's book suggest that this re­
sult is not untenable (pp. 19-27, 73-89). 
At bottom, Professor Carter offers up a consequentialist vision of 
free speech: take seriously dissent from disaffected members of the 
community, be prepared to defend the existing social ordering on the 
merits, or face the growing possibility of dissenters renouncing their 
loyalty to the government and seeking change through an inherent 
right of revolution. At the same time, he emphasizes that "I am not 
insisting that the ability of a community to define itself must be with­
out limits" (p. 89). Nevertheless, Carter concludes that: 
in a society founded on ·a  Declaration of Independence that warns 
against the rejection of repeated petitions of the citizenry, those limits 
should be few, and we must avoid the totalizing tendency to treat all of 
our deeply held values as principles by which not only the national sov­
ereign but every community, no matter how constituted, must be bound. 
[p. 89] 
The problem, of course, is that religious dissenters not only want to be 
self-regulating (to a large extent they already are), but rather that they 
wish to impose a theocratically inspired set of health, safety, and mor­
als regulations on everybody else! 
Again, I do not disagree with Prof�ssor Carter's suggestion that 
religious dissenters bent on imposing "totalizing" theocratic visions on 
the body politic should have their say; the First Amendment should, at 
a minimum, debar government from picking and choosing free speech 
winners and free speech losers.147 Religiously motivated speakers 
146. Actually, Mr. Eric Robert Rudolph appe�rs to have jumped the gun. In the last 
three years, he allegedly has bombed the Atlanta Olympic festivities, a lesbian bar, and sev­
eral abortion clinics. See Thomas B. Edsall, Clinic Bombing Probed For Link to Rudolph, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1999, at A20; Sue Anne Pressley, Carolinians Doubt Rudolph Is 
Hiding In Their Mountains, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1999, at A3. No serious person could ar­
gue that Mr. Rudolph's actions are justified because the general community decided to hold 
an international athletic competition that celebrates international cooperation, tolerates bars 
catering to a predominantly lesbian clientele, and permits abortion se):Vices. But see Carolyn 
Tuft & Joe Holleman, Inside the Christian Identity Movement, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Mar. 5, 2000, at AS (describing the rise of the Christian Identity movement and the penchant 
of some adherents to use violence when less drastic approaches fail to achieve social 
change). 
147. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); see also Kunz v. New York, 
340 U.S. 290 (1951). But cf. Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct. 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Womens' Health Ctrs, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
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should (and do) enjoy the same free speech rights as those engaged in 
nonreligiously motivated speech activities.148 That said, I worry about 
the implications of Professor Carter's theory when the religious dis­
senters fail to convince the general public to embrace their vision for a 
virtuous community. Perhaps he seriously believes that a polite audi­
ence will satisfy religious dissenters, even if they inevitably fail to se­
cure meaningful reforms. One would have reason to believe, however, 
that Jehovah might demand something more than democratic dis­
course, if democratic discourse fails to get the job done. 
With respect to homosexuality, Professor Carter suggests that 
meeting religious objections would be a relatively simple task: 
So, even though, for reasons I have already noted, it is foolish and his­
torically naive to meet religious objections to homosexuality by asserting 
that religionists cannot impose their moral judgments on anybody else, it 
strikes me as fairly easy to meet the objections on the merits, that is, to 
defend the privacy right that covers sexual conduct. [p. 91] 
It might be easy to make logical arguments about the benefits of 
living in a society that respects sexual autonomy as an integral aspect 
of personal autonomy, or personal privacy. It is quite another thing to 
believe that such arguments would prove persuasive to someone who 
takes Leviticus literally, and believes Leviticus to be the divine word 
of God made known to man. Indeed, if the argument were so self­
evident and easy to make convincingly, one might ask Professor 
Carter to explain the seeming anomaly of Bowers v. Hardwick,149 a 
case in which the Chief Justice of the United States invokes the 
"Judeao-Christian" proscription against homosexual sodomy as a suf­
ficient reason for sustaining a Georgia law prohibiting it.150 
The fact of the matter is that reasoned discourse stands little 
chance against the divine word of God. Thus, it seems hopelessly na­
Yve to suggest that 
[o]ne triumphs, in other words, by doing that which I have stressed else­
where is the only democratic way to meet religious claims of morality in 
the public square: to argue against them on the merits, by presenting the 
case for defeating them in terms independent of the religious source of 
the values in question. [p. 91] 
But why is there any reason to believe that reasoned discourse will be 
at all convincing to a person who sincerely believes she is attempting 
to do God's will? Indeed, a person who devoutly believes that, by ob-
148. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-95 
(1993) (prohibiting viewpoint discrimination against religiously motivated speakers wishing 
to use school facilities after-hours for a film series); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi­
tors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 
(1951). 
149. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
150. See id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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taining (or, as is often the case preserving) a proscription against a 
particular sexual activity, she will be "saving" potential sinners from 
their own base appetites is unlikely to be moved by policy arguments, 
no matter how artfully constructed. It is more than ironic that Profes­
sor Carter would call for respect and tolerance of people who, in many 
instances, do not accord similar respect and tolerance to sexual mi­
norities. How does the Christian so-called "formerly gay" movement 
fit into Professor Carter's moral universe? Why should a gay man or 
lesbian take seriously someone who views their most basic life choices 
as an abomination, something to be "fixed," whether voluntarily or 
not? 
Perhaps anticipating these criticisms, Professor Carter notes that 
"[a]s a scholar and citizen who is a Christian, I worry about the obses­
sion of some members of my faith with rules to govern sexuality" (p. 
91). With all due respect, tell that to the parents of Matthew Shepard. 
Moreover, please explain to them why the anti-gay protestors at 
Matthew's funeral merit careful and solicitous consideration, as these 
zealots chant that their son burns in hell because "God hates fags."151 
The remarkable cruelty of some "religious dissenters" toward sexual 
minorities has become so extreme152 that even religious leaders long 
151. Associated Press, Protest Greets Meeting on Antigay Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
1999, at A30. Among the anti-gay protests were signs reading "Matt is in hell and God hates 
fags," Scott Simon & Mark Roberts, Matthew Shepard Funeral, NPR Weekend Saturday, 
Transcript No. 98101703-214 (Oct. 17,- 1998), "No Fags in Heaven" and "No Tears for 
Queers," Tom Kenworthy, A Gentle Spirit Mourned, THE RECORD, Oct. 17, 1999, at Al. In 
a circus-like atmosphere, anti-gay protesters screamed that "fags, if you don't repent, he will 
bum in hell right now," "it's the word of God," Simon & Roberts, supra, "God don't live by 
Sodom and Gomorra," "He lived in shame, he died in shame," Dennis Shepard et al., ABC 
Nightline, Transcript # 98101601-j07 (Oct. 16, 1998), and "Matthew was wicked!," Registers 
Wire Service, Nation Grieves for Shepard, DES MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 17, 1999, at 1. Just 
in case, the protesters also "blanketed the local media with profane leaflets to make sure 
that they were noticed." Shepard et al., supra. Surely National Public Radio commentator, 
Scott Simon, got it exactly right when, in opening a report on Matthew Shepard's funeral, he 
began by noting that "[t]he greatest tragedy that life can call upon a parent to experience is 
to bury a child." Simon & Roberts, supra. To expose Mr. and Mrs. Shepard to homophobic 
taunts and jeers at the funeral of their murdered son represents an almost unimaginable ca­
pacity for cruelty. 
152. Religiously motivated bigots regularly picket political meetings of gay and lesbian 
organizations, see Peter Baker, Clinton Equates Gay Rights, Civil Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 
9, 1997, at A18 (reporting that during a Human Rights Campaign fundraiser featuring Presi­
dent Clinton, a "small cluster of people holding signs saying 'God Hates Fags' " stood out­
side the hotel); at religious celebrations of gays and lesbians, see Rene Sanchez, At Gay 
Wedding, Methodists Take A Vow Against Church Ban, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1999, at A3 
(reporting that outside a convention center where two lesbians were being married by a 
Methodist minister, "the mood was tense. Under the close watch of police officers on 
horseback, about a dozen protesters who were kept across the street railed against homo­
sexuality, waving signs such as 'God Hates Fags' "); and even, sadly, at the funerals of gay 
men who die of AIDS or at the hands of bigots, see Associated Press, Protest Greets Meeting 
on Antigay Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at A30 (noting that Rev. Fred Phelps and 
other Christian protesters "taunted gays at the funeral of Matthew Shepard"); Annie 
Gowen, Holy Hell, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1995, at Fl ("Phelps pickets funerals of AIDS vic­
tims."). Given the utter incivility of these religiously motivated speakers, it is difficult to un-
1662 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:1613 
associated with anti-gay speech activities have taken great pains, of 
late, to show that they hate the sin but love the sinner.153 
The infamous Reverend Fred Phelps, of Topeka, Kansas, provides 
a useful illustration. Rev. Phelps regularly pickets churches in Topeka 
(and elsewhere) that he deems insufficiently committed to eradicating 
homosexuality, welcoming worshippers with greetings such as 
"Sodom! That's a sodomite church!," and "It's a leper colony. Un­
clean! Unclean! "154 Phelps and his supporters told a local Episcopal 
minister that he "drink[s] anal blood at the altar of the sphincter" and 
chanted "Rectum Bob, smells like his name."155 Then, there are the 
good old standbys on signs, placards, and t-shirts: "Thank God for 
AIDS," "Fags Bum in Hell," and "God Hates Fags."156 Phelps is an 
apostle of hate, who nevertheless 'claims· that his mission has divine 
sanction because "God hates them [homosexuals] too."157 Professor 
Carter cites Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. as a paradigm of the 
religiously motivated dissenter. The problem, of course, is that not all 
religious dissenters will pursue a more just ordering of the community 
- witness Rev. Phelps. 
At an even more extreme position from Rev. Phelps, consider 
Benjamin Matthew Williams, another deeply committed person of 
faith who, in July 1999, shot and killed a gay couple in Sacramento, 
California. In an interview with a reporter from a local newspaper, 
Williams explained that "I'm not guilty of murder." Why? "I'm guilty 
of obeying the laws of the Creator . . . .  So many people claim to be 
Christians and complain about all these things their religion says are a 
sin, but they're not willing to do anything about it."158 Obviously, it 
would be grossly unfair to characterize all religious dissenters as hav­
ing a common cause with persons like Rev. Phelps or Mr. Williams. 
Nevertheless, people like Phelps and Williams are engaged in relig-
derstand why Professor Carter believes that the general community owes them anything 
more than a polite hearing on the merits of their positions. 
153. See Frank Rich, Has Jerry Falwell Seen the Light?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1999, at 
A17. As Rev. Falwell recently put the matter, "Many of us pastors like to talk about loving 
the sinner but hating the sin . . .  [but] unfortunately, that statement has often become a 
meaningless cliche . . .  [because] we too often fall short of the mark of . . .  truly loving the 
sinner." Id. (last omission in original). Rev. Falwell explained that "[a]dmittedly, evangeli­
cals have not exhibited an ability to build a bond of friendship to the gay and lesbian com­
munity. We've said to go somewhere else, we don't need you here [at] our churches." Id. 
(alteration in original). 




158. Rich, supra note 153; see also Bailey, supra note 69 ("Benjamin Williams said the 
slaying of the gay couple was justified as an execution because they had violated biblical law. 
He said his defense in the murder case will be based on his belief that the Bible condemns 
homosexuality as a crime punishable by death."). 
May 2000] Dissent, Free Speech, and the Continuing Search 1663 
iously motivated dissent.159 To the extent that Professor Carter could 
be understood to seek a careful hearing of the views expressed by such 
folk and their ilk, he asks far too much of the community in general 
and sexual minorities in particular.160 The First Amendment might re­
quire that people who cheerfully assert that "Fag is a good Bible word, 
don't forget,"161 be free of direct government censorship.162 It does not 
require that the community take them or their views seriously. 
Professor Carter makes frequent reference to anti-abortion protes­
tors as models of those engaged in religiously motivated dissent (pp. 
19-21, 60-61, 80-81, 89-95, 134-36). As with anti-gay protestors, the 
tactics of some in the pro-life movement breach even the most mini­
malist expectations of civility. Although "[p ]eaceful picketing has rou­
tinely occurred outside clinics, with demonstrators carrying signs or 
placards expressing their viewpoint that abortion is murder," anti­
abortion protest activities have gone well beyond relatively passive 
picketing efforts "to [include the] disruptive use of bullhorns, the 
forming of a 'gauntlet' through which patients must pass, the photo­
graphing of patients, and the taunting of clinic personnel."163 Some 
pro-life activists engage in "sidewalk counseling," which can involve 
anything from attempts to engage a patient in a conversation about 
her abortion decision to threats and physical intimidation. "Over the 
years and recently with greater frequency, clinic protest has escalated 
159. The Supreme Court has made clear that expressive conduct constitutes speech, 
even if it is not constitutionally protected under all circumstances. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 402-06 (1989); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-78 (1968). 
160. In this regard, it is difficult to find much moral fault with the "angry mob" that 
pelted Phelps and his disciples "with eggs and excrement" as they attempted to protest at the 
funeral of gay writer Randy Shilts, who died of AIDS. See Gowen, supra note 152. As a 
legal matter, Reverend Phelps is, of course, entitled to- the fullest protection that the First 
Amendment has to offer. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); see also 
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875, 878-80 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). As Justice Frankfurter succinctly put the matter, "The 
State cannot of course forbid public proselytizing or religious argument merely because 
public officials disapprove the speaker's views." Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 282 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
161. Gowen, supra note 152 (quoting Rev. Phelps). 
162. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-11 (1940); see also Niemotoko v. 
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); id. at 273, 282-89 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). As 
Justice Blackmun explained in Pico, "our precedents command the conclusion that the state 
may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that idea 
for partisan or political reasons." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
163. Laurence J. Eisenstein & Steven Semeraro, Abortion Clinic Protest and the First 
Amendment, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (1993); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 171 (1990) (reporting that the pro-life movement's 
tactics "have included picketing clinics and the homes of clinic staffs, shouting at women 
who seek abortions, pelting pregnant teenagers with plastic replicas of fetuses, harassing 
clinic employees, chaining themselves to doors, and lying motionless in streets and drive­
ways"). 
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in scale and intensity."164 "For many women and teenage girls, Opera­
tion Rescue's blockades have turned the experience of seeking an 
abortion into a nightmare of jeering demonstrators, a spectacle that in 
tum attracts the added horror of media coverage of this intensely per­
sonal decision."165 Moreover, speech activity has given way to violent 
expressive conduct: "More violent methods of protest, such as fire­
bombing and arson, are not uncommon occurrences at clinics that 
provide abortion and family planning and referral services."166 
In light of the increased passion of pro-life protestors, state and 
federal courts have proved willing to limit pro-life protestors' speech 
activities, issuing injunctions that limit not only attempts to impede 
physical access to clinics, but also prohibiting sidewalk counseling and 
requiring "that protestors act in a non-threatening manner (e.g., no 
more than two protestors may approach a patient), remain reasonably 
quiet, and cease their counseling if the patient expresses a desire not 
to hear it."167 To be sure, behavior sufficient to constitute an assault, 
even if engaged in for the purpose of registering opposition to legal­
ized abortion, should not enjoy constitutional protection. That said, it 
is difficult to square basic free speech theory with restrictions that re­
quire protestors to cease speaking when asked to stop or that require 
protestors to remain "reasonably quiet." It is unthinkable that such 
restrictions would be sustained against protestors objecting to racial 
discrimination.168 Although courts have responded to the fact of on­
going clinic violence with increasingly broad injunctive relief, fringe 
pro-life groups have pledged to continue using force to stop the provi­
sion of abortion services, up to and including murdering physicians 
providing abortions and their staff members.169 
164. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 225. 
165. TRIBE, supra note 163, at 172. 
166. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 225; see also FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO 
CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT OF 1994, s. REP. No. 636, at 6-10 (1994), reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 703-7fJ7 (describing the growing problem of violence at abortion clinics). 
167. Eisenstein & Semeraro, supra note 163, at 231. 
168. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
169. See Arianne K. Tepper, Comment, In Your F.A.C.E.: Federal Enforcement of the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, 17 PACE L. REV. 489, 492-95, 535-40 
(1997). Roy McMillan, a member of the Mississippi Abortion Abolition Society, frames the 
issue in very plain language: 
It is justifiable to shoot abortionists. It would be immoral not to do so when all else has 
failed. The title's been turning for the past year and a half. People are realizing that vio­
lence, violent tactics and shootings are becoming more effective. I have no problem pre­
dicting that more doctors will be killed. It's the biblical mandate to protect the innocent un­
born. 
Marc Cooper, The Changing Landscape of Abortion, GLAMOUR, Aug. 1995, at 251 (inset 
box). A Mobile, Alabama Roman Catholic priest, Rev. David Trosch, has gone so far as to 
predict that politicians who support abortion rights will be assassinated: "Perhaps, even 
probably, the lives of those politicians who fail to strongly oppose abortion will be at risk." 
Tepper, supra, at 494. 
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The Reverend David C. Trosch, a defrocked Roman Catholic 
priest from Mobile, Alabama, teaches that the murder of abortion 
providers is morally justified: "[W]e will see the beginning of massive 
killing of abortionists and their staffs" because killing those involved 
in providing abortions constitutes "justifiable homicide."170 In his 
view, "[d]efending innocent human life is not murder,"171 and 
"Catholic theology is very clear that the innocent are to be protected. 
And the death of an assailant, if warranted, is commendable."172 An­
other zealot, Don Treshman, argues that "[w]e're in a war" and "[t]he 
only thing is that until recently the casualties have only been on one 
side. There are 30 million dead babies and only five people on the 
other side, so it's really nothing to get all excited about."173 
Allowing that anti-abortion protestors have fared worse than anti­
gay protestors in Congress and in the courts,174 the same question 
raised in the context of anti-gay protests applies with full force in this 
context: how does one engage in a dialogue with someone who sin­
cerely believes that God commands an immediate end to abortion 
services on demand (and by any means necessary)? The more ex­
treme members of the pro-life movement openly promise to use vio­
lence if they fail to achieve political results within a time certain and 
no amount of dialogue is likely to alter their point of view. 
Of course, it might be desirable for members of the community to 
attempt to engage these angry citizens - just as such an intervention 
might be useful with Rev. Phelps or Mr. Williams. Undoubtedly, some 
members of the pro-life movement might be open to compromise or, 
having been given a respectful audience, might agree to abjure vio­
lence in support of the pro-life cause. To this extent then, attempts at 
dialogue could produce some positive results on a case-by-case basis. 
It seems hopelessly optimistic to think, however, that Rev. Trosch 
(and others like him) will agree to accept any outcome other than total 
victory.175 Moreover, clinic patients, staff, and physicians - the usual 
170. Laurie Goodstein, Suspended Priest Preaches "New Theology" of Antiabortion 
Homicide, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1994, at A3; see also Gustav Niebuhr, To Church's Dismay, 
Priest Talks of "Justifiable Homicide" of Abortion Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at 
A12. 
171. Niebuhr, supra note 170, at Al2. 
172. Colman McCarthy, Kennedy, the Church and Dissent, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1994, 
at Bll. 
173. Catherine S. Manegold, Anti-Abortion Killing: The Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
1995, at A26. 
174. That is to say, no federal statute authorizes injunctive relief against anti·gay pro­
tests, nor have courts issued injunctions to limit the antics of Rev. Phelps and his merry 
band. 
175. See, e.g., John Kifner, Finding a Common Foe, Fringe Groups Join Forces, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, § 4, at 3 (describing the activities and attitudes of violent anti-abortion 
protestors, including Neal Horsley, "who maintains an anti-abortion Web site with a logo of 
dripping blood and a list of doctors who perform abortions - their names are crossed out if 
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audience for such speech activities - have no moral or civic obligation 
to attempt such an effort and their failure to attempt a dialogue should 
not be construed as an excuse for violence.176 
Neither the criminal activities nor the gross and anti-social behav­
ior of some anti-abortion protestors should lead courts or legislatures 
to conclude that all anti-abortion speech activities - even disruptive 
protests at the clinics themselves - should be unprotected. Simply 
put, anti-abortion protestors should not be subjected to viewpoint­
based legislative and judicial limits on their speech activities. That 
said, one would understand completely if a clinic patient or staff 
member faced with a fetus-wielding protestor were to abjure any ef­
forts at dialogue and engagement. 
In short, Professor Carter is undoubtedly correct to assert that re­
ligious dissenters should enjoy the same free speech privileges as those 
who base their dissent on secular grounds. He also is correct to note 
that religiously motivated speakers have led important social reform 
movements, including both the abolition and civil rights movements. 
At the same time, one should not forget that religiously motivated 
speakers also led witch hunts, the Inquisition, and the Crusades. So, 
just as federal judges do not possess perfect moral vision, one should 
not suppose that religiously motivated dissenters always support jus­
tice (or, to use the language of belief, properly understand God's will). 
To the extent that one does not share a religious dissenter's theo­
logical commitments, and to the extent that the religious dissenter's 
they are killed"). Mr. Horsley seems to bear out Professor Carter's dire predictions; he justi­
fies the murder of clinic personnel as follows: 
The Federal government made up its mind to block any nonviolent attempt to stop abor­
tion . . . . The Federal Government literally drove men mad, moved them to execute abor­
tionists. When a Federal monolithic government begins to crush the rights of a minority, if 
the issues truly matter, fighting men rise up and do the things that fighting men do. In the 
life and death struggle to stop this unjustified slaughter, Christian men are looking down the 
barrel of a rifle. 
Id. Of course, given Mr. Horsley's description of his intended object - "stopping abortion" 
- anything short of a total ban or prohibition on abortions would not be acceptable. 
176. One should note that Professor Carter never embraces or endorses violence as a 
consequence of failing to take religiously motivated dissenters seriously - he simply pre­
dicts that a failure to maintain a meaningful dialogue increases the probability of a resort to 
violence, without reaching any definitive conclusions about the moral or legal status of such 
a response. Pp. 9-13, 73-78, 80-86. In my view, dissatisfaction with the results of the political 
process in the contemporary United States should almost never serve as an excuse to engage 
in acts of political terrorism. See Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Civil Disobedience and the 
Law, 44 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1969) (arguing that "strong moral conviction is not all that is 
required to turn breaking the law into a service that benefits society," noting that "civil dis­
obedience necessarily involves violation of the law, and the law can make no provision for its 
violation except to hold the offender liable for punishment," rejecting, in unqualified lan­
guage, the use of violence in aid of any political, social, religious, or economic objective, and 
concluding that, in the contemporary United States, one should embrace "an almost irrebu­
table presumption that civil disobedience is not justified"). Although Professor Carter does 
not embrace violence as a response to marginalizing religious dissent, he does not squarely 
denounce it. Pp. 75, 77-78. 
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position rests on these commitments, I disagree with Professor Carter 
that merely pointing out that fact fails to constitute an adequate re­
sponse by the community. If a religious dissenter asserts that "God 
hates fags" and therefore sodomy laws should be strictly enforced, it is 
more than an adequate response to assert that "my God does not hold 
such an attitude toward sexual minorities." Religious dissenters do 
not have a right to force the general community to defend autonomy­
enhancing legal norms by merely asserting that "God commands 
thus." To the extent that Professor Carter suggests otherwise, he 
makes an unreasonable demand on the general community.177 
Dissent implies an opportunity to make your case, nothing more 
and nothing less. Religious dissenters should enjoy the same rights of 
access as those who offer secular reasons for their dissent. The 
Supreme Court's recent cases involving protests at anti-abortion clin­
ics represent an important and unfortunate derogation from this gen­
eral principle.178 But a right to make your case does not imply a right 
to win, should your case prove unpersuasive to the community. 
Moreover, just as the state cannot prescribe the manner in which one 
presents her case, the state should not attempt to prescribe the man­
ner in which citizens decide to respond to the arguments of religiously 
motivated dissenters.179 
Finally, one might question the overall accuracy of Professor 
Carter's assertion that government ignores the concerns and sensibili­
ties of traditionally religious citizens. During the current election sea­
son, both Vice-President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. 
Bush have been at great pains to share their personal relationships 
with Jesus with the general electorate.180 When asked to name his "fa-
177. See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
352, 401 (1985) ("[T]o demand that other people act in accord with dominant religious be­
liefs is to promote or impose those beliefs in an impermissible way."). 
178. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 120 S. Ct 2480 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 
519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v. 
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). Indeed, Justice Scalia has established a pattern of voting 
against granting certiorari in abortion protest decisions because "experience suggests that 
seeking to bring the First Amendment to the assistance of abortion protesters is more likely 
to harm the former than help the latter." Lawson v. Murray, 119 S. Ct. 387, 388 (1998) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in denial of a writ of certiorari); see also Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 
1110, 1116 {1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in a denial of a writ of certiorari) ("Last Term's de­
cision in Madsen . . .  has damaged the First Amendment more quickly and more severely 
than I feared," but opposing review because "clarification of Madsen is . . .  unlikely to occur 
in another case involving the currently disfavored class of antiabortion protesters."). But see 
Williams v. Planned Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 {1997) {Scalia, J., dis­
senting from denial of a writ of certiorari). 
179. In this regard, a careful reader should note that Professor Carter's arguments are 
not constitutional in nature, but rather represent policy-based recommendations about how 
private citizens should respond to the phenomenon of religiously based dissent. 
180. See Maureen Dowd, Playing the Jesus Card, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1999, at A23. 
"About 74 percent of those polled described themselves as religious people." John Herbers, 
Religion Enters A Political Revival, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1984, § 4, at 1. With numbers like 
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vorite political philosopher," Governor Bush responded "Christ, be­
cause he changed my heart."181 Gore, anxious to establish his religious 
credentials, has proclaimed himself to be a "born-again Christian" on 
"60 Minutes" and told columnist Sally Quinn that he regularly asks 
himself "W.W.J.D."182 This evidence strongly suggests that religiously 
motivated speakers should have little to fear from Washington. As 
syndicated columnist Maureen Dowd astutely observed, "When the 
Kansas board of education removed evolution from the science cur­
riculum testing to make way for creationism, neither Mr. Gore nor Mr. 
Bush could bring himself to utter a word in defense of scientific 
truth. "183 
In a recent book examining the increasing political muscle of re­
ligious conservatives, Wendy Kaminer argues that complaints about 
marginalization to the contrary, religiously conscious citizens wield 
more and more secular power.184 After all, Congress and state legisla­
tures are busily trying to post the Ten Commandments in schools and 
courthouses, not remove them.185 In a similar vein, Professor William 
Van Alstyne has suggested that the problem is not the marginalization 
of religiously motivated citizens, but rather a creeping risk of 
theocracy: 
A constitutional neologism has nearly displaced the much different fig­
ure of speech, that of a "wall of separation" between church and state, 
which Thomas Jefferson once used in commemorating the ratification of 
the first amendment. The neologism is that insofar as most persons are 
religious, it is altogether natural that government should itself reflect that 
fact in its own practices. Thus according to this neologism, it is not help­
ful to regard the First Amendment as having emplaced a wall separating 
the practices of religion from the practices of government, for it is not 
walls, but bridges, that the first amendment contemplates.186 
Van Alstyne's argument is that religiously motivated activists 
threaten the secular state, rather than vice-versa. Considered from 
this perspective, Professor Carter's thesis that pious citizens are sys-
that, it seems highly unlikely that members of mainstream religious groups face a serious 
prospect of being either silenced or ignored. 
181. Dowd, supra note 180. 
182. Id. This acronym translates to "What would Jesus do?" See id. 
183. Id.; see also Dan K. Thomasson, Religion and Politics: A Volatile Mix, SUN 
HERALD (Biloxi, MS), Dec. 28, 1999, at B2 (quoting the author's father as warning him to 
"[b]e careful of those who wear their religion on their sleeves or who find the need to certify 
themselves as true believers. They can be dangerous to the rest of us"). 
184. See WENDY KAMINER, SLEEPING WITH EXTRA-TERRESTRIALS: THE RISE OF 
lRRATIONALISM AND TiiE PERILS OF PIETY (1999). 
185. See Angie Cannon, Civics or Religion?: Commandments Clash, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 2000, at 36 (describing various legislative proposals for posting the 
Ten Co=andments in public schools and other public buildings). 
186. Van Alstyne, supra note 134, at 771. 
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temically ignored or disempowered, represents a disconnect from con­
temporary political realities - at least insofar as traditional (or 
"mainstream") denominations are concerned. 
IV. THE COMPELLING CASE FOR ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUSLY 
MOTIVATED DISSENT AIMED AT SECURING GREATER 
REsPECT FOR CULTURAL PLURALISM 
Professor Carter essentially describes two fundamentally different 
kinds of dissent associated with religious minorities. Religious minori­
ties sometimes enter general public policy debates in an attempt to en­
sure that the civil code reflects their subjective religious commitments. 
In many respects, religious minorities engaged in protest against abor­
tion rights or gay rights fit this profile. Throughout much of The 
Dissent of the Governed, Professor Carter expressly embraces this 
kind of dissent aimed at recreating the general community, comprised 
of both believers and non-believers, in a religious community's own 
image (pp. 89-95). 
On the other hand, Professor Carter correctly posits that members 
of religious communities voluntarily submit to an authority wholly in­
dependent of the secular state. "[S]elf-constituted communities of 
meaning, unlike the Constitution-bound political sovereigns, may cen­
sor both the words and acts of their members" (p. 87). In creating 
self-constituted communities of meaning, religious organizations re­
quire the ability to make and enforce demands of their adherents. "A 
community that is unable to adopt and enforce its own vision of harm, 
based on its own epistemology, quickly ceases to be a community that 
can engage effectively in acts of self-definition" (p. 89). Here, Carter 
is not talking about religious minorities imposing their views on the 
general community, but rather enjoying some measure of self­
definition within their own self-constituted communities, communities 
that exist within the larger, general community. This is a huge distinc­
tion. 
Professor Carter attempts to claim the same First Amendment 
status for both kinds of religiously motivated dissent (pp. 89-99). Nev­
ertheless, arguments in favor of creating legal breathing room for re­
ligious minorities stand on a very different footing than his pleas for 
the general community to consider seriously dissent aimed at estab­
lishing a theocracy. Dissent in the service of securing legislation ac­
commodating religious practice does not represent an attempt to hi­
jack the institutions of the civil state in the service of jihad or pose any 
serious threat to the maintenance of a pluralistic democracy (pp. 122-
30). Both kinds of dissent register disagreement with the policies of 
the general community, but it seems to me that the general community 
ought to treat quite differently offensive and defensive species of re­
ligiously motivated dissent. 
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When a religious minority group complains that a general law un­
duly burdens the ability of its members to meet their obligations of 
conscience, the community has an obligation to listen. By stipulation, 
discrete religious minorities are unlikely to enjoy broad representation 
within democratically elected state legislatures or in the federal Con­
gress. Accordingly, the effects of general laws on discrete religious 
communities might well fail to register on the political radar screen 
when a legislative body enacts a general proscription against a par­
ticular behavior or an administrative agency enacts a rule regulating a 
particular kind of behavior.187 
The Supreme Court has refused to interpret the Free Exercise 
Clause as excusing members of religious minorities from compliance 
with general laws.188 Thus, the ability of religious minorities to obtain 
exemptions from highly burdensome laws is entirely contingent on 
their ability to make their case to the general community in an attempt 
to build a coalition of support for legislatively modifying the general 
rule that impedes their ability to practice their faith.189 In this sense, 
then, an appeal to the body politic constitutes the only potential route 
of securing effective relief from general, but highly burdensome, laws 
affecting the ability of a given religion's adherents to practice their 
faith in deed as well as word.190 
187. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); 
see also Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting, but not 
deciding, that the effect of laws on fundamental liberties, such as freedom of speech and on 
"discrete and insular minorities" might require a "more searching judicial inquiry" especially 
if the law at issue might "tendO seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"); ELY, supra note 120, at 73-88, 93-94, 
101-16, 135-79 (arguing that the federal courts should carefully consider the effect of their 
decisions on racial and cultural minorities and should, to the extent feasible, construe consti­
tutional text to further the process of "representation reinforcement" (i.e., enhance the rela­
tive political voice of permanent racial and cultural minorities within the political commu­
nity)). 
188. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145 (1878); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
189. Of course, if a legislative body enacted a facially neutral general law, but harbored 
animus toward a particular religious group when enacting the law, such that the law's real 
purpose was to burden the religious community, the Free Exercise Clause would provide a 
source of relief. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). Undoubtedly, some general laws are the product of religiously motivated animus or 
hatred; most, however, are not. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the most bur­
densome laws to a given religion necessarily will be laws enacted in an effort to burden the 
group. Thus, benign neglect can be just as deadly to religious minorities as intentional dis­
crimination. Indeed, because instances of benign neglect will not support a free exercise 
claim under the ruling in Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, they constitute a much more important 
impediment to the existence of self-defining religious communities. 
190. See generally Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 209, 212-17 (1994); Douglas Laycock, The 
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. Cf. REV. 1, 7-10, 30-39, 41-59; William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Four­
teenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 304-06 (1996); Eugene Volokh, A Common Law 
Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1481-89 (1999). 
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Before the community denies a religious community the ability to 
observe the dictates of the members' collective consciences, it ought to 
afford the members a fair hearing. When a religious community seeks 
to establish a system of voluntary rules for its own governance, the 
community's rules might well run afoul of existing general laws.191 
Perhaps the best recent example involves the Native American 
Church's practice of ingesting peyote incident to a sacred rite. Many 
jurisdiCtions - not to mention the federal government - classed pe­
yote as an addictive, anti-social drug worthy of complete proscription. 
The facts are a great deal more complicated: peyote is not particularly 
addictive; it happens to be a powerful emetic, limiting its intrinsic ap­
peal to a general audience; no general street traffic in peyote exists; 
and the use of peyote is integral to the religious rites of the Native 
American Church.192 
On these facts, the case for prohibiting the Native American 
Church's members from ingesting peyote is incredibly weak. Apply­
ing a general policy against the use of psychotropic drugs for recrea­
tional purposes simply does not make sense in these circumstances, 
unless the general society is committed to enforcing its notions of mo­
rality on a discrete and insular religious minority simply because it has 
the raw power to do so. Over time, most jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation abandoning their prohibitions against peyote, at least if 
used incident to religious rites by the Native American Church.193 A 
dialogue about the necessity of applying general anti-drug laws and 
policies to peyote facilitated a reasonable accommodation of a relig­
ious minority. This is the First Amendment at its best. Moreover, if 
Professor Carter is correct to suppose that "repeated injuries" will be 
met at some point with armed resistance (perhaps justifiably), it is far 
better to engage in a dialogue jn the hopes of reaching an arrangement 
that meets the needs of both the general community and the religious 
minority. 
191. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding against a free 
exercise claim, an Air Force regulation prohibiting non-uniform headgear, including yar­
mulkes); Volokh, supra note 190, at 1483-84 (describing how general laws against carrying 
weapons in public, arguably preclude Sikhs from wearing religiously mandated ceremonial 
daggers, or kirpans, and the potential application of zoning laws to prohibit a religious group 
from meeting in a private'home located in a residential area); Eugene Volokh, Intermediate 
Questions of Religious Exemptions - A  Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 595, 655-56 (1999) (describing the potential effects of ordinary and seemingly reason­
able government decisions on persons with nondominant cultural or religious obligations). 
But cf. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the then-valid 
Religious Freedoms Restoration Act and holding that Sikh school children may wear kir­
pans to school, subject to some elementary safety concerns). 
192. See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Divi­
sion v. Stnith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 963, 983 (1998) [hereinafter Epps, Unknown God]; 
Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 
563, 579-80 (1998) [hereinafter Epps, Free Exercise]. 
193. See Epps, Unknown God, supra note 192, at 999. 
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In this sense, then, Professor Carter's call for the general commu­
nity to respect religious dissenters and engage in dialogue with them 
makes a great deal of sense. When religious minorities are seeking to 
preserve their very existence - rather than attempting to impose par­
ticular theistic commitments on the general community - they must 
be heard. Of course, it probably would be asking too much of gov­
ernment to create a First Amendment jurisprudence that drew a line 
between religious speech seeking accommodation and religious speech 
seeking to establish theocracy. And, as Professor Carter notes, relig­
ious communities engage in speech aimed at both objectives. 
The only plausible response is to afford all religious dissent a seri­
ous hearing. When the object of the dissent is a heartfelt desire to im­
pose a theocratically inspired rule on the general community, a polite 
"thanks but no thanks" is all the response that religious minorities can 
rightly demand. Just as a Jehovah's Witness has no general right to 
occupy a private individual's living room, religious communities have 
no general right to hijack the institutions and agencies of the civil state 
in order to implement a particular version of God's will. As the 
maxim teaches, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. No 
matter how well-intentioned, overtly religiously inspired, general 
community regulations raise very serious problems in a pluralistic so­
ciety. 
On the other hand, when religionists seek an accommodation to 
preserve their very existence or identity, the community should be put 
to the task that Professor Carter proposes: in these circumstances, the 
community should be required to offer reasons in support of the appli­
cation of the general rule to the religious community. Make no mis­
take, this is not an argument about some absolute right of the religious 
community to an exemption from a generally applicable law. Instead, 
it is an argument that religious communities deserve reasons from 
their fellow citizens when law severs the ability of a believer to put 
faith into action. 
It is, of course, far easier "to say, simply, Do this - and have it 
done, like the servants of the centurion in the Gospel parable" (p. 99). 
As Professor Carter cautions, "[t]hat is the sense in which power tends 
to corrupt, even in a democracy: when one possesses power for too 
long, law becomes less the glue that knits us together than the name 
that we give to the conclusions for which we would rather not offer ar­
guments" (p. 99). Carter rightly denominates as a dangerous form of 
"fundamentalism" a system in which "law need not be explained as 
long as it is spelled out (inerrantly) and obeyed (unquestioningly), for 
we know it to be right" (p. 99). Thus, when a law denies conscience 
the freedom to act and the community refuses to give reasons for 
maintaining the law, religious minorities have a legitimate objection to 
the community's insensitive behavior. Given the Supreme Court's 
unwillingness to balance the claims of religious minorities against the 
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ability of the general community to write and enforce general rules, it 
is all the more essential that the body politic take seriously religious 
dissent. 
V. CONCLUSION: HEARING (DIS)HARMONIES IN THE 
CHORUS OF DISSENT 
There is a kind of negative synergy between Professor Shiffrin's 
and Professor Carter's dissent-based theories of free speech. Profes­
sor Shiffrin conceives of a dissent-based theory of free speech as en­
hancing the relative voice of cultural minorities to achieve a more just 
state. This project probably does not include laws criminalizing abor­
tion and homosexual sodomy, much less laws imposing other relig­
iously inspired limitations on personal autonomy (particularly when 
these rules further marginalize already marginalized cultural minori­
ties). Nevertheless, a dissent-based theory of the First Amendment 
should create as much possibility for reactionary change as it does for 
progressive change. Thus, free speech critics are probably correct to 
suppose that the free speech principle is not necessarily conducive to 
achieving their social agenda. 
Professor Shiffrin's effort to translate the free speech principle into 
a device that empowers minorities fighting for progressive causes 
seems unlikely to work. To the extent that dissent protects the reac­
tionary or racist speaker as much as the progressive speaker, it con­
ceivably does more harm than good to the project of securing progres­
sive change. Indeed, Professor Carter's vision of dissent would 
empower those working in direct opposition to many of the causes 
that Professor Shiffrin appears to hold dear. Thus, if winning is the 
most important objective, mainland China's approach to dissent seems 
more likely to prove successful than a serious commitment to free and 
open debate about matters of public concem.194 
Similarly, Professor Shiffrin's theory of dissent in the service of 
progressive change serves as a powerful proof of Professor Carter's 
basic complaint: religious minorities are being denied their full meas­
ure of participation in the project of democratic deliberation. To the 
extent that religious minorities position themselves in opposition to 
progressive understandings on issues of race, gender, and sexual orien­
tation, they increasingly face the prospect of being silenced by gov­
ernment officials who have come to embrace the progressives' value 
structure. 
194. See supra note 32; see also Charles Fried, Diversity: From Left to Far Left, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 3, 2000, at A19 (describing the Association of American Law School's refusal to 
facilitate joint programs with the Federalist Society, the National Association of Scholars, 
and the Christian Law Society, all conservative organizations, while cosponsoring events at 
its annual meeting with the Society of American Law Teachers ("SALT"), a left-leaning or­
ganization). 
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Professor Shiffrin plainly believes that dissent not only creates the 
possibility of dialogue, but also facilitates change, citing the civil rights 
movement as an example of how dissent can forge new understandings 
of justice. If one were to implement fully Professor Carter's vision of 
dissent, undoubtedly religious dissenters would prevail more often in 
securing legislative changes that implement their religiously inspired 
ideals of good governance. That said, Professor Carter's vision is pal­
atable only to the extent that the "dialogue" does not simply exchange 
one group of oppressed and alienated persons for another (i.e., relig­
ious conservatives for women or sexual minorities). 
Shiffrin's confidence in the ability of dissent to promote change 
raises serious questions about the potential effects of fully embracing 
Carter's proposal for requiring the secular state to justify on the merits 
every law or policy religious dissenters oppose. Given that dissent 
provokes change, this sort of "dialogue" undoubtedly would portend 
mixed results for women, racial minorities, and gays and lesbians, all 
groups that historically have supported the kinds of "progressive" so­
cial policies often opposed by religious fundamentalists. 
This, of course, is not an argument for silencing religious funda­
mentalists. It is, perhaps, an argument that legitimates a response that 
simply rejects the religious premise of the fundamentalist dissenters; 
whereas Carter would have the defenders of the secular state justify 
existing policies on secular grounds in the face of religious opposition, 
there is no reason that other members of the community (but not the 
state itself) should not simply reject the religious premises underlying 
the objections. The state, of course, can itself neither maintain nor 
suppress particular theological commitments, but all citizens are free 
to follow the dictates of their conscience, at least with respect to mat­
ters of belief. Given the potential effectiveness of dissent in moving 
public policy, those opposed to one religious tradition should be free 
to argue against proposed changes in terms that are either secular or 
religious. Moreover, if religious dissenters lose this debate, it hardly 
justifies making war against the state. 
In sum, a meaningful commitment to dissent is a kind of social wa­
ger, an experiment that guarantees a process, but does not prefigure 
any outcomes.195 Considering the potential effect of a particular the-
195. In the immortal words of Justice Holmes: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to be­
lieve even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ulti­
mate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not 
every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowl­
edge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant 
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught 
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and 
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country. 
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ory of freedom of expression on dissent provides an excellent means 
of analyzing the plausibility of the theory; a free speech theory that 
fails adequately to protect dissent should be highly suspect. Of course, 
it is one thing to evaluate free speech theories according to how dis­
sent would fare; it is entirely another to posit dissent as the sum and 
substance of the Free Speech Clause. For the reasons set forth in this 
Review, a dissent-based theory of free speech presents very serious 
problems, at least insofar as one wishes to· maintain viewpoint neu­
trality as a central component of the free speech project. 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the definitional and opera­
tional difficulties, securing the protection of political speech of a "dis­
senting" cast has to be an important, indeed essential, objective of any 
plausible theory of free speech. As Professor Vincent Blasi has ex­
plained, "the overriding objective at all times should be to equip the 
first amendment to do maximum service in those historical periods 
when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when 
governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent systemati­
cally."196 How best to achieve this objective, both jurisprudentially 
and doctrinally, remains elusive. Although Blasi may be correct to 
suppose that "[i]t is doubtful that legal standards could ever be de­
signed with sufficient prescience and precision"197 to constrain effec­
tively the lower federal courts' discretion when faced with difficult 
free speech cases, a system that openly invites entirely intuitive or ad 
hoc decisions about the relative value of speech activity surely pres­
ents a greater threat to project of democratic deliberation.198 Because 
the threat to free speech principles is likely to be most acute in times 
when the value of dissent is potentially at its highest,199 an ideal test 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
196. Blasi, supra note 23, at 449-50. 
197. Id. at 467. 
198. Indeed, Professor Blasi seems to recognize this: 
Courts working within a first amendment tradition that authorized judicial inquiry into mo­
tivation, impact, and form would be tempted in pathological periods to find something dis­
tinctive in the speech of the most unpopular dissenters (concerted or surreptitious conduct, 
· indoctrination, nihilistic motivation, coercive or selective impact) that would place it outside 
the ambit of first amendment protection. An expansive tradition regarding the reach of the 
first amendment would make it more difficult for judges to invoke such characteristics as a 
basis for suppressing speech. 
Id. at 477-78. Justice Hugo Black, of course, strongly endorsed the utility of strict tests and 
bright lines, believing such tests essential to prevent judicial backsliding. See Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 
N.Y.U, L. REV. 865, 866-67, 874-76, 880-81 (1960); see also Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and 
First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 552-55, 557-59 
(1962); Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 
UCLA L. REV. 428, 441-53 (1967). 
199. See id. at 485 ("Any ad hoc assessment of the benefits and costs of speech that is 
rnade during pathological times is bound to be tilted in the direction of regulation; that is an 
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would therefore safeguard dissent even when the social or political 
consequences of doing so might well be uncertain.200 
At least arguably, Professor Shiffrin's dissent theory does not take 
seriously enough the problem of enforcement through personnel se­
lected by majoritarian representatives - personnel who presumably 
would share the attitudes, values, and prejudices of the dominant 
groups within the community. · Conversely, Professor Carter's basic 
objection is that cultural elites already ignore or silence the speech of 
religiously motivated dissenters. Neither Professor Shiffrin nor Pro­
fessor Carter offers up a comprehensive and potentially effective pro­
gram of reform - a prescription that would ensure that dissent re­
mains an important component of the process of democratic 
deliberation. That said, both authors significantly advance the debate 
and bring a much needed renewed focus on centrality of dissent to the 
free speech project. 
Almost any free speech theory is likely to engender immediate 
objections - objections that, as often as not, will lead to various 
"clarifications" or "amendments." The author, thus, gradually refines 
the theory to include speech that she believes should enjoy constitu­
tional protection (but arguably does not under the initial articulation 
of the theory).201 Over three decades ago, Professor Harry Kalven 
suggested that a commitment to permitting free (even if factually inac­
curate) commentary on the government constituted the "central 
meaning" of the Free Speech Clause.202 To be sure, this is a plausible 
theory. On the other hand, myriad alternate theories exist, and it 
would be difficult - if not impossible - to devise a single animating 
purpose that adequately would encompass all the reasons why citizens 
should view free speech as an essential right in a pluralistic, participa­
tory democracy. Accordingly, discovering the "central meaning" of 
the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause almost certainly will re­
main a work in progress, and attempts to limit attention to a single as­
pect of the free speech project are likely to do more harm than good. 
inevitable consequence of the shift in attitudes regarding the desirability of free speech that 
characterizes such periods."). 
200. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); but 
cf. Blasi, S11pra note 23, at 507-09 (describing the failure of the federal courts to afford strong 
protection to dissenters in periods of perceived national crisis). 
201. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment, supra note 9, at 256-57 (modifying the 
"democratic deliberation" theory of free speech to reach the arts and literature because an 
educated population is necessary to sustain self-government). Of course, many would argue 
that the arts and literature have value independent of the role they play (if any) in facilitat­
ing self-government. Moreover, as Professor Robert Post has noted, Meiklejohn's original 
thesis also fails to incorporate the importance of autonomy values to free speech theory. See 
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 268-76, 282-89 (1995). 
202. See Kalven, supra note 7, at 204-21. 
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Professors Shiffrin and Carter have provided rich commentaries on 
the centrality of dissent to free speech theory and jurisprudence - al­
beit from different ideological perspectives. Their books are impor­
tant contributions to the ongoing dialogue about the First Amend­
ment. That said, I do not think that either has succeeded in ending the 
quest for the central meaning of the First Amendment. Nor is this, in 
any meaningful way, a bad thing. The journey - the search for the 
ultimate answer - can sometimes be more important than attaining 
the object of the quest. It seems fitting to conclude with another cau­
tionary note from Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette: 
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end 
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many 
good as well as by evil men . . . .  Ultimate futility of such attempts to 
compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort, from the Roman 
drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the In­
quisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles 
as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our pres­
ent totalitarian enemies . . . .  It seems trite but necessary to say that the 
First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends 
by avoiding these beginnings.203 
203. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943). 
